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1981
Beyond Methodengaging opposition in psycho-social organization- / - Prepared for the meeting on methodology of the Goals, Processes and Indicators of Development Project (GPID) of the United Nations University. Organized by the Division of System Studies of the University of Bucuresti, Bucharest, 1-4 December 1981
Disagreement-phobia1. The basic point of this paper is that our society has proved itself unable to design any frameworks, whether conceptual or organizational, in which disagreement is an accepted, permanent integral feature. The frameworks now used era all based on the assumption that agreement and consensus is the essential element an which any viable organization depends. As a consequence disagreement can never be tolerated except through processes designed to eliminate it (e.g. conflict resolution, mediation, arbitration). These of course include competition and violent conflict, in which victory, through the downfall of the opponent, is sought.2. It would seem that all intellectual and political effort is directed either toward achieving some measure of agreement or toward manipulating any disagreement to the advantage of one party so that the disagreement is suppressed and a particular "agreement" prevails. Even arguments for a "moral equivalent of war" are based on the necessity of believing that a victor can emerge and eliminate the disagreement. 3. Perhaps the most tragic consequence is the amount of effort devoted to the illusion of "peace" in which disagreement is somehow absent, inactive or without functional significance. This is the simplistic ideal that "all men will be brothers", which ignores the basic issue of how to structure a society in which brothers disagree - as they do with great frequency and for extended periods of time. The significance of the "peace movement" lies not in the essentially fragile ad hoc agreement to demonstrate on particular occasions, but rather in the disagreement with other power groups. 4. At this point in time much hope is placed on reaching agreement on a set of values or ethical standards an the key to any action strategy. There is no evidence whatsoever that thin hope is well-founded for the foreseeable future.. Every item of evidence indicates the contrary - unless strategies based or the imposition of a set of values are considered acceptable, whether or not they are viable as a result of the imposition process. 5. The immediate relevance of this argument can be seem from the following quotations concerning the recent Cancun conference.
Great hopes are once again placed on the slender possibility that something of major significance could emerge from the new round of "global negotiations" which it was tentatively' "agreed should be held in the future. This possibility diverts attention from the essential problems of disagreement which have undermined the significance of all previous initiatives of this kind. 6. The fear of situations in which disagreement prevails is such that they are shunned, whether unconsciously of, by well-ration alized processes. Where they cannot be avoided, much effort is devoted to amplifying the significance of whatever minor items can be discovered on which agreement in achieved. A Veneer of agreement is thus generated to disguise fundamental disagreement. Agreement then becomes an essentially superficial pretence of little operational significance. A tragic example is the vast body of resolutions generated by United Nations bodies and almost immediately forgotten. According to the International Herald Tribune (24 Nov 1981):
In the case of UNESCO, these are now being generated by "consensus voting" to avoid the problems of disagreement. 7. A strange feature of the preoccupation with seldom-achieved agreement is that little attention is given to the processes which are able to occur once that condition has been achieved. To the extent that it is not superficial, agreement involves a degree of homogeneity in approach which is rapidly repudiate as constricting and alienating. Dynamism of any sort is associated with disagreement. 8. In a very meaningful sense, the present is in basic disagreement with the past and with the seeds of the future as they emerge. Again it is not the continuity from past-to-present-to-future which provides significant information, but rather the dynamics arising from the disagreement of past and present positions (as epitomized by generation "gaps") The nostalgia occasionally encountered for a "golden age" in the past, and the hopes projected onto some utopian ideal in the future have a common weakness. In both cases their significance lies in their contrast with the tensions and disagreements of the present. Such ideal settings are seen as disagreement free and, consequently, there in great difficulty in describing their processes in an attractive manner. 9. An obvious feature of academic or even political life is the relative lack of significance attached to agreement with a particular thesis - except in terms of the essentially "mechanical'' process of marshalling support to ensure that a particular position triumphs and maintains its position. Of much greater interest to those involved is the process of responding to the challenge of those who manifest disagreement. It is this which is the stimulus which energizes many psycho-social processes. Associating for any length of time with a group of people in basic agreement is of very little interest - unless a new level disagreement can be discovered. 10. It is useful, in the light of the previous points, to view the development process as one based on disagreement rather then agreement. Little "happens' if everyone agrees. With the introduction of disagreement comes the possibility of development. To stress consensus as a key to development, is to come dangerously close to destroying the basis for its dynamism. Development can only occur if there is disagreement with the current state of affairs. 11. The previous point suggests that there is a fundamental weakness in the "liberal goodwill" viewpoint which has encouraged the favourable attitude towards solving all the "nasty'' world problems. This has effectively generated a kind of conspiracy of consensus, based an mutual tolerance, and a horror of disagreement which has progressively under- the original thrust. Indeed, once every issue becomes a "motherhood" type issue, namely one which calls for unthinking, universal agreement, then no further progress is possible. The "mutual tolerance" mentioned is counter-productive to the extent that it de-activates disagreement and the dynamics associated with diversity. 12. Because a sense of dynamism would seem to be a fundamental nee,!, the reality of groups making up the "peace movement", for example, is one of extensive fragmentation. Sadly to some, the constituent groups are usually extremely hostile to one another. Since disagreement is an anathema, each group turns in upon itself or towards its special. constituency and avoids any reflection on the significance of that disagreement for the future of "peace". But the identity of each group is clarified by dynamics which reinforce for it the understanding of why it cannot possibly associate or agree (other than te m- under special circumstances) with any of the other groups. A similar point could be made with regard to the "ecology movement". 13. The previous point comes even more into focus in the case of the various movements for "equality". The goal of such movements is to eliminate "inequality". However it is no exaggeration to remark that the amount of "inequality" in the world is now greater than ever before. "Equality" is well-implanted as an ideal, hut indicators of its universal non-achievement are all too evident. Society is at present primarily characterized by non-equality, except for a variety of token legal rights whose significance in practice is negligible or cosmetic. It is no longer sufficient to play out the pretence of operating in an egalitarian society - this only permits the unrecognized dynamics to reinforce the fundamental disagreement between ideal and reality. It also prevents exploration of the significance of the disagreement and the inequality. 14. There are presumably many traditional psycho-cultural reasons which reinforce the treatment of disagreement as an anathema, and in many cases as "bad" and inherently "evil". It is disagreement which banishes man from the Garden of Eden, introduces dissonance into the mythical Golden Age, and destroys the "golden age" of childhood experience. It is a denial of the spiritual union which is fundamental to many religions. As such it is necessarily the "work of the devil" or his equivalent. Even Pythagoras is supposed to have rejected the irrational disagreement associated with the square root of 2. 15. Such views strongly influence the manner in which an "enemy" is defined as a result of disagreement. "If you are not with me, you are against me" and, as such, to be contained (or eliminated, if possible). No religion, Hinduism possibly excepted, has developed a viable framework for dealing with disagreement - with well-known consequences. Equivalent problems occur with ideologies. In both cases considerable difficulty is experienced with disagreement giving rise to schisms which in the religion case may be labelled "heresies". These give rise to violent exercises in suppression. 16. Disagreement is also a major problem in mass movements such as trade unions for which the key word is "solidarity". Disagreement undermines the solidarity which is vital to successful bargaining and must therefore be violently suppressed. In societies based on the dictatorship of the proletariat, as an extension of such mass movements, the problem of handling "dissidence" remains unresolved. 17. Discontinuity is a special form of disagreement. It is only very recently that the study of discontinuity has proved -1 possible or admissible in mathematics as catastrophe theory [3], despite the general nature of the problem and the practical value of the results to natural and social sciences. Discontinuity, as a form of disagreement, has presumably been a victim of its subconscious association with death an(' accidents although birth also constitutes a discontinuity. 18. From a theoretical standpoint, disagreement generally implies invalidity or error. There is an extremely well-developed tendency to disguise error, because of the way it is related to job performance and. career evaluation. This is true of professionals, of bureaucrats, of businessmen, and of scientists. It is also true in organizational reporting procedures, whether military, business or government. Glossy "public relation," reports prevail.. It is unfortunate that it should even be necessary to make the following point:
19. The response to disagreement between achievements as planned and as implemented introduces a special kind of blindness. Planning reinforces awareness of social reality as perceived through the system under implementation. As lived however, individuals are obliged to cross the boundaries between systems which do not "recognize" each others existence, and between new systems (possibly incomplete or already breaking down) and whatever remains of older (or even very old) systems. The lived reality is characterized by widespread incompatibility that is experienced as a kind of hubris between the various systems. A material indicator is the standardization problem of getting parts to fit or match. A bureaucratic indicator is the traditional problem of "red tape". Others are more subtle. It is very difficult to grasp these forms of disagreement. 20. The problem of handling disagreement is also evident in the design of legislative assemblies for complex societies. The traditional 2-party Westminster assembly has only proved successful in a few countries and it can be argued that its success is largely one of creating the impression that it is a success. Complex issues (e.g. defence budgets) can no longer be given more time then simpler ones and there is little time for most issues, especially new ones. Many developing countries have abandoned multi-party assemblies as being "unsuitable". This may be considered an indication that exposure to disagreement is actively avoided there: opposition is forbidden or suppressed. Scientific suppression of disagreement1. It is the philosopher of science Paul Feyerabend who hap recently drawn attention, dramatically to the manner in which science-as-practised suppresses disagreement in a somewhat desperate search for the single method and the ultimate theory (4). He argues that this bears a relation to how science advances (when it advances) and that this confusion Is dangerous for society.2. Feyerabend argues that:
He considers that this massive dogmatism is not just a fact but also has a most important function. Science would be ,impossible without it (4, p. 298). Furthermore: 3. He considers that the belief that science has found some special method is simply a fairy-tale.
4. Feyerabend then points out that:
5. Disagreement amongst sciences is in practice resolved by vote contrary to what is normally claimed:
6. The unity of science is itself a myth:
7. Given this situation, the danger lies in the generalization of this myth in disguise:
8. It is ironical that, the avoidance by scientists disagreement, as described above, and the scientific dedication to the elimination of discrepancies in theory, are complemented by the deep disagreement amongst philosophers of science concerning the nature of the scientific process itself. Significance of incommensurability1. Feyerabend clarifies his own favoured approach as follows:
2. For, when a new theory or methodology has been elaborated:
3. He concludes as follows:
4. Feyerabend takes this argument even further:
5. On this basis he continues:
6. In discussing incommensurability, Feyerabend draws attention to the problem of science as rational:
7. He welcomes the use of apparently rational arguments to introduce revolutionary doctrines in the guise of familiar, common sense statements, as a means of transforming common sense itself (4, p. 200). Rationalists will then:
8. Feyerabend summarizes his position on incommensurability in the form of three theses:
9. Feyerabend argues against the assertion of Karl Popper's that "What is true in logic is true in psychology .... in scientific method, and in the history of science". He points out that there exist legitimate scientific statements which violate simple logical rules. He gives examples of statements which play an important role in established scientific disciplines and which are observationally adequate only if they are selfcontradictory. (4, p. 258) 10. According to Feyerabend, if many facts become available only with the help of alternatives:
11. Feyerabend points out that "Nobody admits that there could be various forms of knowledge and that it might be necessary to make a choice". (4, p. 213) Consequently, he argues that:
Approaches to the art of disagreement1. The previous section suggests that there is a major need for a "science of disagreement" to clarify the manner in which active disagreement can be usefully structured. It appears that agreement in society is essentially superficial or token (if it prevails at all). There is a total absence of knowledge on how to disagree intelligently in an organized manner, rather then in an irrational, fear-ridden manner requiring some form of violent response to eliminate the disagreement as soon as possible. 2. It might be assumed that the methodologies of conflict resolution, mediation or arbitration would provide guidelines for a science of disagreement. This is not the case. Such methods are primarily concerned with eliminating the disagreement between the parties, or reducing it to a level at which it is not significant for their relationship. 3. In looking for a "science" of disagreement some care is necessary as the previous sections have shown. Science, as it claims to be practiced, can be usefully considered to be about agreement processes and the elimination of disagreement. "Art" may however be considered to be about disagreement processes, set against a background of the rise and fall of agreement. Agreement is not useful without disagreement. In fact it is meaningless. It is the disagreement which introduces the essence of diversity and avoids the uniformity of undifferentiated mass consciousness.4. There is an obvious problem in using Feyerabend's "method" as a basis for any art or science of disagreement. He explicitly advances his views as epistemological anarchism and states:
But he goes further in arguing that science is itself anarchistic:
But the somewhat quixotic element in his extremely valuable approach is then revealed in his remarks on its status in his own view (as the author):
5. Feyeraband takes us to the very useful point at which it is possible to say that "disagreement is OKI' and that scientific progress might be impossible if imperfections were eliminated (41 p. 255). But, as an anarchist, he is obviously totally uninterested in the need to "organize" disagreement in any way, even if it were possible. As a result his approach provides no clues for any new way of organization which could take account of new levels of disagreement. 6. The most fruitful guide to further understanding of disagreement should be found in writings on dialectics, which were clearly of value to Fayerabend. But whether it be in the writings of Hegel Marx, Engels or Lenin, or in recent writings on dialectics as it emerges in modern science (e.g. complementarity, etc), there is little to be gleaned beyond the concept of the essential (thesis, antithesis, synthesis). Most authors emphasize the intimate relationship to the cognitive subject-object process, about which it is necessarily difficult to be "objective" without distorting comprehension of its essential dynamism. Thus: "If we try to analyze what it is that the threefold describes, we are in a bind for it is just that element of participation in life that analysis cannot, and does not even pretend to, cope with" (5, p. 57). "Since it is basically nonconceptual, it cannot be defined..." (5, p. 27). For this reason dialectics has been most favoured as a method by those capable of anchoring it in practical action a concrete material context. 7. The Marxist scholar Jean-Marie Brohm points out that neither Marx nor Engels attempted to define dialectics positively (6, p. 43). They defined it negatively by the criticism of adverse positions, as have most of their successors:
8. Hegel summarizes the essence of dialectics as follows (as quoted by Brohm):
9. In commenting on Hegel's Science of Logic (7), Lenin clarifies one of Hegel's definitions of dialectics by the following:
Then he further clarifies these elements in 16 points (8, pp 209-210):
10. In the case of psychologist Jean Piaget, there are five characteristics of dialectics:
These five properties of dialectics are summarized by a sixth which gives its general significance: "dialectic constitutes the inferential aspect of all equilibration". This means that dialectics does not intervene at all stages of cognitive development, but only during the course of the equilibrating process. It is therefore important to distinguish carefully between the state of equilibrium corresponding to a non-dialectic moment of evolution and the dialectic processes permitting the construction of new frameworks. Piaget distinguishes eight kinds of interdependency (9, p. 213-227). A co-author, Rolando Garcia, draws attention to similarities between Piaget's concept and that of Lenin as detailed above (9, pp 233-237). 11. In one of the few studies that also reviews non-marxist concepts of dialectics, Paul Foulquié concludes with the following general definition:
12. Despite the relevance of dialectics to the problem of disagreement, as noted above, it does not appear to do more than explain the dynamics of the environment it constitutes. It explains the eventual future evolution beyond the stage of disagreement, but does not clarify the nature of any possible present order whilst the disagreement holds. It does not clarify the nature of the psycho-social forms to which disagreement can give rise in the present, it merely affirms that they are necessarily temporary. The question is whether there is any pattern in the present to the ancillary processes to which a dialectical confrontation gives rise. Is it possible to discover any underlying structure to disagreement? For example, evident disagreement might be considered to be structured like interference patterns from distinct interacting wave sources. Or disagreement might be compared to recent thinking on the relationship between interacting parallel universes. 13. More accessible to reflection (but spread over time) is the concept of development stages, of which the beat example is the individual human being. Development for the individual is a series of separations which give rise to a qualitatively different sense of unity. Stages include:
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