1986
Communicable Insights
-- / --
(a) The geometry of connectivity
In this annex to Comprehension of Appropriateness,
the arguments of the previous annex can be clarified and taken a step further
using the work of Ron Atkin on q-analysis, namely the theory and application
of mathematical relations between finite sets. He has applied this to the analysis
of communication patterns within complex organizations. (38, 39, 40).
The perceptual significance of this approach is well-illustrated by visual
sensitivity to colours resulting from the three primary hues (red, green and
blue). These may be represented on a simple triangle (see Figure 7).
| Figure 7 |
 |
0-dimension vision:
--- Red, Green or Blue
1-dimension vision:
--- Yellow (=Red/Green);
--- Purple (=Red/Blue); or
--- Turquoise (=Blue/Green)
2-dimension vision:
--- White (=Red/Green/Blue)
|
Here the vertices (O-simplexes) represent the primary hues, the sides are twofold
combinations (1-simplexes), and the combination of the three hues makes the
central white (2-simplex). The 2-simplex, together with all its faces, forms
a simplicial complex KY (X) where X is the vertex set (red, green, blue) and
Y is the set of seven perceived colours.
Now to be able to see all the colours, a person's vision needs to have the
ability to function in the triangle as 2-dimensional 'traffic' on that geometry,
moving from location to location adjusting to the complexity of the geometrical
structure which carries the visual traffic. It however the person's vision is
limited to 1-dimensional traffic, then white could not be perceived because
the visual traffic of seeing is then restricted to the edges and vertices only.
Similarly, if the person's colour vision is only O-dimensional, then it is restricted
to the vertices. It can only see one vertex colour at a time and never a combination
(as represented by an edge). If vision was 3-dimensional, it would allow traffic
throughout the geometry, but would perceive other colours as well, calling for
a fourth vertex in order to contain the full range of combinations.
If the geometry represents concepts or languages (or modes of socio-economic
organization) instead of colours, then it would be expected that some people,
in relation to that set, would have O-dimensional comprehension (i.e. sensitive
to isolated primary issues only) and others would have 1-dimensional comprehension
(i.e. only sensitive to binary combinations of primary issues). The latter
would be unable to maintain attention to three concepts simultaneously in order
to perceive the threefold combination (the central, integrated 'white'
issue). The threefold issue may then be termed a 2-hole in the pattern of communication
connectivity amongst those involved. For 2-dimensional traffic however, the
issue complex is coherent, comprehensible and well integrated. For the 1-dimensional
traffic, it feels less secure as a whole, since the latter may only be experienced
sequentially through a succession of experiences ('around the edges')
from which the shape of the whole may be deduced but not experienced For O-dimensional
traffic, the integrated concept does not exist, since experience is disconnected.
'Generally speaking it seems to be confirmed that action (of whatever kind)
in the community can be seen as traffic in the abstract geometry and that this
traffic must naturally avoid the holes (because it is impossible for any such
action to exist in a hole). The holes therefore appear strangely as objects
in the structure, as far as the traffic is concerned. The difference is a logical
one in that the word 'q-hole' describes a static feature of the geometry
S(N), whilst the world 'q-object' describes the experience of that
hole by traffic which moves in S(N)' (38, p. 75).
As an 'object' this phenomenon is an obstacle to communication and
comprehension and obliges those confronted with it to go 'around'
in order to sense the higher dimensionality by which it is characterized. Communications
'bounce off' such objects. As a 'hole' this phenomenon engenders,
or is engendered by, a pattern of communication. It appears to function both
as 'source' and 'sink'. Atkin suggests that, in some way
which is not yet fully understood, such object/holes act as sources of energy
for the possible traffic around them. From the initial research it would appear
that such objects/holes are characteristic of communication patterns in most
complex organizations. It seems highly probable that they can also be detected
in any partially ordered pattern of communication. As such 'societal problems',
'human needs', and 'human values' merit examination in this
light from the perspective of different languages and modes of socio-economic
organization.
Very concretely, Atkin has investigated situations in which the 'vertices'
(which could themselves be n-simplexes in a multidimensional geometry) are individuals
or offices linked together through various committees. They could also be governments
or disciplines. There will then be a lot of O-traffic and 1-traffic within and
between offices due to the details of their intra-and inter-office (bilateral)
operations. This traffic will circulate around the holes/objectswhich they constitute.
Any n-level traffic can only be encompassed, or be brought to rest, by an (n+1)-level
body (e.g. an executive or a committee). If the latter does not exist, such
traffic will continue to circulate around the q-objects in the structure and,
according to Atkin, may be defined as noise. An 'empire builder' (or
any elite), for example, in such an organizational system will carefully create
many q-holes underneath him (at the n-level), so that subordinate bodies answerable
only to his appointees, are trapped in the flow of noise between them (38, p.
129). Atkin notes that even though the geometry may not have been rendered explicit,
such structures generate the feeling throughout a community of some 'power
behind the scenes' acting to outwit the formal structure. The special value
of q-analysis is that it can clarify why action/discussion in connection with
(development) issues tends to be 'circular' in the long-term, however
energetic it may appear in the short-term. As such it shows how social change
is blocked by the way in which conceptual traffic patterns itself around the
sensed core issue which is never confronted as such because the connectivity
pattern is inadequate to the dimensionality of the issue. This would explain
why so many issues go unresolved and why the process of 'solving'
problems becomes institutionally of greater importance than the actual 'elimination'
of the problem.
The elements of the triangle may also be used to represent different modes
of socio-economic organization comprehensible under different conditions. It
is possible for a person or an organization to conduct all its communication
in terms of one of these modes or frameworks. Communications in terms of other
modes or frameworks would be incomprehensible and to some degree inconceivable.
It is possible to envisage a different paradigm, corresponding to the 1-dimensional
traffic, which would permit movement between the primary modes via intermediate
modes. This would correspond to the mind-set of a polyglot or a polymath, for
example. Presumably more complex paradigms could also be envisaged. Atkin analyzes
much more complex situations in exploring information flows through the committee
structure of a complex organization. He is especially concerned with how information
on substantive issues gets moved around through appropriate committees without
it being necessary to confront core issues or bring them into focus, namely
the bureaucratic technique of handling information overload by avoiding use
of that information.
Q-analysis gives precision to the recognition that traffic of different degrees
of content connectivity finds (or creates) its appropriate level in any psycho-social
communication conmplex, presumably including a language. Communicable insights
are level-bound, especially where they are of high connectivity. In other words,
at the level within which we can communicate, concepts cannot necessarily be
anchored unambiguously into terms and definitions which 'travel well'.
Precision introduces distortion which is only acceptable locally within any
communicating society - although 'locally' must be interpreted in
the non-geographical sense in which all nuclear physicists are near neighbours,
for example.
The relation between two personal or institutional structures, conceived as
a multidimensional backcloth, carries whatever traffic that constitutes the
communication between them. If this backcloth changes by becoming dimensionally
smaller, then its geometry loses vertices and the consequent connectivity properties.
This is first indicated by the failure of higher dimensional traffic which
the geometry can no longer carry. Such 4-traffic, for example, must then move
through the structure to some new haven of 4- dimensionality or it must change
its nature and become genuine 3-traffic. This process of reducing communication
expectations in order to continue to live within the new warped geometry is
the classical problem of compromising. The feeling of 'having to compromise' is
a painful one. It is the feeling of stress induced by the warping of the communication
geometry, namely the direct experience of a structurally induced force, in this
case a 4- force (38, p. 146-7). It is the feeling associated with the distortion
of an unsatisfactory translation between languages. This approach clearly provides
a very precise approach to understanding more subtle forms of structural violence.
Atkin has applied it to an analysis of unemployment (38, p. 148).
Such considerations suggest the power of q-analysis in clarifying approaches
to human and social development in general. Reducing the dimensionality of
the geometry on which a person (or group) is able to live is an impoverishment
associated with repressive forces. Expanding the dimensionality induces positive,
attractive forces through which a sense of development and enrichment is experienced
(38, p. 163). Q-analysis seems to be a valuable new language through which
precision can be given to intuitive experiences and their communication, particularly
since it provides an explicit measure of obstruction to change.
In the case of social development, it is probable that most continuing societal
problems should be seen as holes/objects, especially given the well-established
record of unfruitful action in response to them - however vigorous and dedicated.
Typical examples are: peace/disarmament, development, human rights, environment,
etc. Q-analysis could then provide understanding of why any action tends to
be drawn into a vortex of futuility, however much it satisfies short-term political
needs for visible 'positive' action. The participants in the action
find themselves 'circulating' around a central concern of which they
are unable to obtain an overview due to the geometries of the overlapping conceptual
and organizational structures through which they work (or which they somehow
engender).
The term 'futility' used above is however only appropriate if the
sole considerations were the elimination of suchproblems. In fact the existence
of such problems is extremely important to the organization of society, to social
development, and to the direct or indirect employment of many people. Just as
the 'defence' business is vital to the economy of many countries,
so is the 'social problem' business vital to many sectors of society.
Eliminating social problems would be a disaster for many people, especially
problem- oriented intellectuals, the employees of problem-solving agencies,
or indeed those in need of stimulus and challenge.
In the case of human development, Atkin shows how the individual can be defined
in terms of a multidimensional geometry requiring a minimum of four levels
(38, p. 111). By relating this geometry to that of society, Atkin introduces
an 8-level scheme (38, p. 162) within which the degree of integration or eccentricity
of communication can be clarified in terms of developmental or anti-developmental
forces.
Concerning such levels, the question arises as to whether their hierarchical
order is fixed. Preoccupations associated with Schumacher's 'small is beautiful',
for example, may well modify the order. The ordering may be a question of orientation
in which the 'top' and 'bottom' elements selected depend
on the preferred concept and direction of development (e.g. 'top-down',,
'bottom-up'). This would be more consistent with the concept of order
as an (existential) choice as discussed above in connection with the various
fourfold 'languages'.
In such a multidimensional geometry it is clear that, whether in the case of
an individual, a group or society as a whole, it is not possible to eliminate
'underdevelopment' as associated with low dimensionality. Such a geometry
will necessarily continue to have traffic of very low-level connectivity co-present
with that of increasingly higher level connectivity. The simplest illustration
arises from the continual birth of infants who will, when resources permit,
continue to be educated through to the level of connectivity to which they can
respond. But there will always be communication at both low and high- connectivity
levels, especially about socio-political issues. The question is then how such
learning communication between these different levels of connectivity can weave
itself together within a social structure.
It is the status of the holes/objects in relation to development which could
provide an interesting point of departure for further investigation. As noted
above, it is not a question of attempting vainly to eliminate such holes, especially
when some of them may arise from alternative concepts of 'development'.
Rather it is a question of how configurations of holes can be identified and/or
designed. It is such configurations of holes which provide the minimum structure
(and communication dynamics) to stabilize and give form to the co-presence of
the differing 'answers' to the challenge of development.
In effect such holes exist at a lower connectivity-level than the 'macro-hole'
of higher connectivity constituted by the world problematique at this time.
This macro-crisis hole 'absorbs' the development initiatives of society
by engendering the immense volume of action/communication traffic around the
hole so defined. This draws attention to the developmental implications of the
probable presence of holes of yet higher dimensionality than can be readily
sensed or made the subject of acceptable public (consensual) communication.
How then are 'better' holes to be engendered within such configurations?
Now from one point of view it is necessary to avoid introducing an element of
evaluation, because from each hole the perception of other holes will be distorted
so that no communicable assessment can be usefully formulated. On the other
hand, it may prove to be the case that, at the level of the configuration as
a whole, more than one such configuration can be identified/designed in order
to interrelate the perspectives associated with the set of holes. And at this
level, without privileging any particular hole, more adequate interrelationships
between the elements making up the holes can be identified.
Expressed differently, introducing evaluative judgements into the relationships
between the holes within a particular configuration can only contribute to
the dynamics between such holes in terms of perceived advantage/disadvantage.
Excessive emphasis on this runs the risk of tearing the configuration apart.
The identities associated with the holes can be respected in each of the configurations
in a series constituting progressively more adequate or richer formulations
of the relationships between 'developments'. There is consequently a
multiplicity of concepts of development operative in society. Individuals and
groups may 'progress' from one to another, possibly with a general
tendency towards those of higher connectivity. But other individuals and groups
will emerge and find the concepts of lower connectivity more meaningful before
moving on, if they do, to those of higher connectivity. (In this sense the 'ontogenesis'
of an individual tends to repeat the 'phylogenesis' of his/her society).
Society in this sense is the arena within which individuals and groups refine
their concept of development.
(b) Frameworks as frozen portions of learning cycles
In different ways the previous sections suggest that it might befruitful to
consider the apparent isolation of languages or modes of socio-economic organization
as being due to an inability to understand how to move between such frameworks.
Although each framework constitutes a rich learning environment, it becomes
a trap if no way can be found to exploit the advantages of other frameworks
when they may be more appropriate. In a sense each framework provides a mode
of information processing which is effectively a frozen portion of a larger
learning cycle. Each such portion, just as with an organ in the human body,
processes certain kinds of information in a manner significant for the whole,
but within the prevailing paradigm there is no means of transferring the significance
extracted to other contexts within the whole where it may be of value.
In the West part of the difficulty lies in the conception of learning as a linear
process resulting in a shift in comprehension from A to B. It is only in the
insights of Western poets that there is any recognition that, as stated by T
S Eliot : 'The end of all our exploring will be to arrive where we started
and know the place for the first time'. Gregory Bateson does however makes
a strong case for the essential discontinuity of the learning process as a 'zigzag
dialectic between form and process' (17, p. 194). If the zigzag is considered
as occuring around a learning cycle however, marrying in the Eastern bias towards
recurrence, this cycle can then be subdivided into sufficiently detailed elements
to be of significance for organizational operations. Jantsch discusses cyclical
organization in terms of the system logic of dissipative self-organization:
'Hypercycles, which link autocatalytic units in cyclical organization,
play an important role in many natural phenomena of self-organization, spanning
a wide spectrum from chemical and biological evolution to ecological and economic
systems and systems of population growth. The cyclical organization of a system
may itself evolve if autocatalytic participants mutate or new processes become
introduced. The co-evolution of participants in a hypercycle leads to the notion
of an ultracycle which generally underlies every learning process'. (41,
p. 15)
The question then becomes how many discontinuous phases (Jantsch's 'participants')
it is useful to distinguish in the cycle. Too few and the incompatibilities
between them are too fundamental, too many and the distinctions between them
are too subtle. The operational significance of this conceptual constraint has
been explored in earlier papers from which it is apparent that significance
is lost if more than about 7 categories are used (42), unless the total breaks
down into sub-sets based on simple (e.g. 2,3,5) factors (43).
A novel approach to the learning cycle in relation to action has been taken
by Arthur Young (44) as a consequence of his experience as the inventor of the
Bell helicopter (whose three-dimensional movement is notoriously difficult to
control. He established the vital learning-action link through a new interpretation
of the operational significance of the set of 12 'measure formulae'
through which material phenomena are observed, acted upon and controlled in
physics and engineering. These he portrays as corresponding to a series of phases
in a learning-action cycle. Of special interest for the development theme is
the significance he attaches to the sequence of movement around the cycle: one
direction involving essentially unremembered experience-without-learning, the
other involving conscious-learning-action. His approach has been adapted and
modified to further emphasize the action-learning significance (Section KD,
1). It is interesting that the philosopher Stephane Lupasco also attaches importance
to the analysis of such measures in terms of the polarities they constitute
and the types of energy with which they are associated (45, p. 26).
*******************
Place Figure 8 here [see subsequent version at http://www.laetusinpraesens.org/docs/learnstr.php)
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This approach clarifies how portions of such a cycle are vulnerable to institutionalization
(as specialized, independent answer domains, or habital responses) to the extent
that there is no learning bridge across the discontinuities. The problem of
(social) integration is thus intimately related to the functioning of (collective)
learning cycles. It seems probable that needs (and their satisfiers) also relate
to different portions of such cycles, as would ranges of incompatible development
goals or alternative visions of desirable futures. In each case the point to
be emphasized is that such seemingly incompatible fragments are 'frozen'
portions of a cycle with which individuals or groups identify. None are of lasting
significance in their own right, especially insofar as they hinder the collective
learning process which must take place through them.
The facilitative and obstructive factors to further learning (i.e. successful
'struggle' in marxist terms) at each stage in the cycle are probably
linked to patterns of complementarity and incompatibility between the stages
according to their memberships of (2,3, or 4-member) sub-sets in the cycle (e.g.
preceding and succeeding stages in the cycle are in conflictual relationship
since they would correspond to thinking of the opposite hemisphere). Answers
given from any part of a cycle are of course 'questionable' as perceived
from other parts of the cycle.
A single cycle is probably not a sufficiently concrete representation of the
complexity to be encompassed by an adequate meta-language. Where several cycles
interlock to form a sphere, the nodes are effectively combinations of cyclic
phases. The relationships of challenge and harmony between such nodes have been
discussed in earlier papers concerning Fuller's tensegrity concept.
The acid test of learning cycles however, is whether they can encompass the
discontinuities between the major political tendencies by which the world community
is seemingly divided. Any such relationship posited must necessarily be highly
controversial, but the controversy should be patterned according to the aspects
of the learning challenges involved. This has been explored elsewhere (11, 46)
(c) Wholeness and the implicate order
The previous sections consider how various essentially complementary frameworks might
be fitted together, in effect a 'bottom-up' approach. Further insight into the
information processing problem may be obtained by assuming than it is biasesin man's
current mode of thought (especially in the case of Western man) which cause such
frameworks to be perceived as separate in the first place.
As a theoretical physicist, David Bohm is concerned with the illusory nature of
fragmentation (47, 48) and the manner in which distinct fragments emerge from wholeness in
movement (49). He sees the perceptual problems with which he deals as being as relevant to
a more healthy response to psychosocial fragmentation as to the problems of fundamental
physics. The value of Bohm's perspective for understanding healthy individual development
has in fact been recently stressed by a physician Larry Dossey (50).
For Bohm: 'the widespread pervasive distinctions between people (race, nation,
family, profession, etc.), which are now preventing mankind from working together for the
common good, and indeed, even for survival, have one of the key factors of their origin in
a kind of thought that treats things as inherently divided, disconnected, and 'broken up'
into yet smaller constituent parts...considered to be essentially independent and
self-existent.' (49, xi).
Attempting to live according to the notion that the fragments are really separate is then
what leads to the growing series of extremely urgent crises with which society is
confronted. 'Individually there has developed a widespread feeling of helplessness
and despair, in the face of what seems to be an overwhelming mass of disparate social
forces, going beyond the control and even the comprehension of the human beings who are
caught up in it.' (49, p. 2). And yet the seeming practicality and convenience of the
process of divisive thinking about things supplies man with 'an apparent proof of the
correctness of his fragmentary self-world view.'
Basing his investigations on insights from the current state of physics, Bohm focuses
'on the subtle but crucial role of our general forms of thinking in sustaining
fragmentation and in defeating our deepest urges toward wholeness or integrity'. (49,
p. 3). He arrives at the conclusion that 'our general world view is itself an overall
movement of thought, which has to be viable in the sense that the totality of activities
that flow out of it are generally in harmony, both in themselves and with regard to the
whole existence.' (49, p. xii). This view implies that 'flow is, in some sense,
prior to that of the 'things' that can be seen to form and dissolve in this flow'.
(49, p. 11). Thus the 'various patterns that can be abstracted from it have a certain
relative autonomy and stability, which is indeed provided for by the universal law of the
flowing movement'. (49, p. 11).
Of special relevance to the question of human and social development, is that the above-
mentioned desirable harmony 'is seen to be possible only if the world view itself
takes part in an unending process of development, evolution, and unfoldment, which fits as
part of the universal process that is the ground of all existence.' (49, p. xii).
This has the merit of grounding the concept of development in movement from which
appropriate conceptual and social forms temporarily arise, rather than, as is presently
done, starting from some 'thing' (e.g. a society, a community, or a person)
which has to be stimulated into a process of movement and change that is then called
'development' (under certain conditions).
Bohm cautions against the expectations of quick remedies: 'To ask how to end
fragmentation and to expect an answer in a few minutes makes even less sense than to ask
how to develop a theory as new as Einstein's was when he was working on it, and to expect
to be told what in terms of some programme, expressed in terms offormulae or
recipes...What is needed, however, is somehow to grasp the overall formative cause of
fragmentation, in which content and actual process are seen together, in their
wholeness'. (49, p. 18).
As he notes, this confronts us with a very difficult challenge: 'How are we to think
coherently of a single, unbroken, flowing actuality of existence as a whole, containing
both thought (consciousness) and external reality as we experience it?' (49, p. x).
The approach he suggests requires looking at the challenge in a new way. Instead of aiming
for some reflective correspondence between 'thought' and 'reality as a
whole' the process of thinking about reality as a whole can more usefully be thought
of as a kind of 'dance of the mind' (determining, and being determined) which
functions indicatively. (49, p. 55-6).
Bohm explores the implications of quantum theory as an indication of 'new
order'. The questions he raises are also relevant the emergence of any new
psychosocial order. He demonstrates that in the past recognition of new patterns of order
has involved attention to 'similar differences and different similarities' (49,
p. 115), namely the 'irrelevance of old differences, and the relevance of new
differences' (49, p. 141). The radical transformation of understanding brought about
by quantum theory, for example, results from recognition of the way in which modes of
obsevation and of theoretical understanding are related to each other.
For Bohm, however, comprehending the new order bears some resemblance to artistic
perception. He uses Piaget's distinction between assimilation (understanding, render
comprehensible) and accommodation (adaptation, fitting to a pattern) as the basic modes of
intelligent perception. This artistic perception then begins by 'observing the whole
fact in its full individuality, and then by degree articulates the order that is proper to
the assimilation of this fact.' (49,p.141) Thus it does not begin with abstract
preconceptions as to what the order has to be, which are then 'adapted' to the
order that is observed.
Bohm uses the differences between a lens system (in measurement processes) and a
holographic system to show how by use of the former 'scientists were encouraged to
extrapolate their ideas and to think that such an (analytical) approach would be relevant
and valid no matter how far they went, in all possible conditions, contexts, and degrees
of approximation.'(49,p.144). The advances in relativity and quantum theory imply,
however, an undivided wholeness in which such 'analysis into distinct and
well-defined parts is no longer relevant.' This is best illustrated by the hologram
in which a whole pattern is somehow encoded into each part, no matter how small. The new
order appropriate to our time could then be conceived as contained as a totality, encoded
in some implicit sense into each region of space and time (49,p.149).
He elaborates an entirely new way of understanding order as 'implicate', or
enfolded, which he contrasts with 'explicate' forms that are commonly observed
and sought. The simplest example he gives is of a television image, carried by a radio
wave in an implicate order, and then explicated by a receiver.
In more general terms, Bohm argues that the underlying wholeness in movement (the
'holomovement'), noted above, acts like the radio wave to 'carry' an
implicate order. Under certain circumstances particular things (objects, phenomena,
people, nations) can then be unfolded from this dynamic totality by a perceiver, but the
holomovement is not limited in any specifiable way at all. As suchit does not conform to
any particular order and is essentially undefinable and immeasurable. This means that no
single theory can capture or contain phenomena on a permanent basis. Rather, each theory
will abstract a certain aspect that is relevant only in some limited context, lifting it
temporarily into attention so that it stands out in relief (49,p.151). Furthermore, any
new order within which a multiplicity of such aspects are 'integrated' is itself
not a final goal (as in efforts at 'unified science'), but rather part of a
movement from which new wholes are continually emerging (49,p.157).
This approach is very helpful in opening up ways of conceiving development and new forms
of social order. In providing a mathematical description of implicate order, for example,
Bohm makes a useful distinction between: transformation, as a geometric rearrangement
within a given explicate order, and metamorphosis, as a much more radical change (such as
between a caterpillar and a butterfly) in which everthing alters, although 'some
subtle and highly implicit features remain invariant'(49,p.160). The former
characterizes much development thinking, whereas the subtlety of the latter has hitherto
made it appear non-operational or equivalent to catastrophe.
Given Atkin's use of simplical complexes to describe social organization, it is also
interesting that Bohm suggests the extension of this technique in terms of
'multiplexes' (49,p.166-7). His argument that phenomena need to be perceived as
projections of a higher-dimensional reality for which appropriate algebras are required
(49,p.188), relates to Thom's concerns with mathematical archetypes (49).
The challenge of Bohm's arguments lies in the manner in which they strike at the very root
of the meaning of human and social development. His arguments highlight the extent to
which both the physical and social sciences continue to rely on a Cartesian framework (if
only in the familiar tabular/matrix presentations characteristic of social science papers)
at a time when inherent weaknesses in the thinking behind such frameworks have been
demonstrated. His most basic point is that the phenomena such as those which are the
preoccupation of 'development' (peoples, ideologies, groups, societies) are
essentially derivative. 'The things that appear to our senses are derivative forms
and their true meaning can be seen only when we consider the plenum, in which they are
generated and sustained, and into which they must ultimately vanish'. (49,p.192) In
this light, the basic flaw in present development thinking is the a priori recognition of
certain distinct social entities which it now seems desirable to
'develop'.
It is precisely this conception (as argued on different grounds by the world-system
theorists) which reduces development to 'sterile' transformative operations and
prevents any metamorphoses (to use Bohm's terms). For it is development which precedes and
underlies such explicate social entities as a movement from which they have been unfolded:
'what is movement' (49,p.203). Metamorphosis thus calls for ways of unfolding
new, currently implicate forms from this holomovement, and enfolding into it those which
are currently explicate, but are inadequate to the time. This is far removed from
mechanistic efforts to 'eliminate' undesirable structures and to
'build' new ones from their components.
It should not be assumed that this implicate order is an inaccessible theoretical
abstraction. Bohm argues that conscionsness itself operates by enfolding and unfolding and
that 'not only is immediate experience best understood in terms of the implicate
order, but thatthought also is basically to be comprehended in this order'.
(49,p.204). This creates the possibility for 'an unbroken flowing movement from
immediate experience to logical thought and back' thus ending the fragmentation
characteristic of the absence of any awareness of such movement (49,p.203). He argues that
movement is itself sensed primarily in the implicate order and that Piaget's work
'supports the notion that the experiencing of the implicate order is fundamentally
much more immediate and direct than that of the explicate order, which...requires a
complex construction that has to be learned' (49,p.206).
Different languages may thus be understood as different ways of unfolding the implicate
order. Atkin's work suggests ways in which the intuitively sensed differences between such
unfoldings may be articulated in mathematical terms which are highly relevant to the
problems of information transfer in modern society.
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