1986
Review of Frameworks for the
Representation of Alternative Conceptual Orderings
as Determined by Cultural and Linguistic Contexts
- / -
Project on Information Overload and Information Underuse (IOIU)
of the Global Learning Division of the
United Nations University (Area 6: Coding and the socio-cultural context of
information, 1986)
Introduction
Clarification of scope
Symptoms of the problem
Cultural determination of information processing
Skewing between languages and cross-language equivalence
Determination of information processing within languages and cultures
Modelling inter-linguistic discontinuity
Implications
Conclusion
References
Annexes
1: Interpretations of cross-cultural information processing implications of Hofstede study
2: Difficulties in the transfer of information between languages
Introduction
This paper explores the influences of implicit or unconscious filters on the
question of information overload and information underuse. There appears to
be relatively little research into this question and therefore the paper attempts
to identify a number of
"points of entry" through which the dimensions of the question can
be understood.
There has of course been a great deal of research into the semantic and psychological
aspects of communication breakdown but in recent years this has tended to emphasizes
communication as a "people process rather than as a language process" (1,
p 205).
Basically the issue appears to be one of the consequences of differences in methods
of expression, conception or learning. This is typified by differences in cultures
and languages. But both culture and language need to be understood in their broadest
sense in order to recognize the dimensions of the issue. In particular it is
not sufficient, as is usually the case, to dismiss "culture" as being of negligible influence on
information processing or as constituting a barrier which can be easily overcome. Nor is
it sufficient to consider the information implications of differences of
"language" as easily surmountable by a variety of translation procedures or the
adoption of a common language. It is precisely the prevalence of such
"superficial" attitudes, together with the remarkable sophistication
with which data can now be manipulated by computer, telecommunications and surveillance
technology, which has led to the assumption that any associated difficulties
are purely of a technical nature. The assumption is reinforced by the interesting
results already achieved in work on machine translation. This paper attempts
to demonstrate that the momentum of the technical approach to information, and
the associated investments, have drawn attention away from fundamental problems
which are vital to any effective response to the issues of information overload
and information underuse.
It should be stressed that this paper is not primarily concerned with the implications
of different languages or cultures as social phenomena. Such differences are
viewed here as the more easily recognized manifestations of a more fundamental
problem. But precisely because of their more recognizable characteristics, concern
with such characteristics has tended to obscure the conceptual problems implied
by such differences. It is these conceptual problems which are to be found in
other arenas in which differences are not so clearly demarcated, as in the case
of languages or cultures, and where they are therefore even more easily ignored
or dismissed.
Recognition of these issues is rendered especially difficult because any apparent
success in describing them within one conceptual framework or language effectively
obscures the nature, depth or subtlety of the differences. These can only be
begun to be appreciated through the process of switching to some second framework
or language. The difference is appreciated experientially in the contrast. Its
quality is lost to a great extent in explanations of it within one or other framework.
Hence the ease with which the significance of such differences can be denied.
Possibly only much later, or when it is too late, is it appreciated how people,
groups and organizations develop implicit areas of non-communication which contribute
significantly to the problem of information overload and information underuse.
Clarification of scope
As suggested above the issues can only be effectively explored by examining
them within a broader context. This necessitates a broader interpretation of
several
"concepts". However, in the light of the theme of this paper, it is
neither possible nor desirable to present definitions.
(a) Language: In this discussion "language" includes :
- spoken or written languages such as English, Chinese or Sanskrit;
- languages, which select particular words from written languages, defining them as terms
of specialized significance whose use is governed by certain theories or laws; the use of
such languages is a prime characteristic of certain discipline or schools of
thought;
- systems of notation through which logical and mathematical insights into patterns of
relationship are clarified and communicated;
- computer languages such as COBOL, FORTRAN, ADA, C, PL1, etc; these combine features of
mathematical notation and the specialized use of words noted above;
- identifiable methods or systems of expression which may not necessarily rely on univocal
use of words, but may, as in poetry, playfully explore other patterns of
significance;
- systems of communciation using non-verbal means, whether, graphics, music, movement or
the many symbolic devices favoured by the media and public relations campaign to influence
public opinion.
This broader sense may therefore be considered as covering any systems of expression
capable of conveying or filtering patterns of significance. It therefore combines the two
arenas (whose distinction is lost in English but retained in French) of "langue"
and "langage". This broader interpretation is consistent with current
recognition that ordinary language, whether written or spoken, is only one member of a
class of coherent symbolic communication systems (2, p. xii). Nalimov argues that the
broad view of language results from the work of cybernetic linguistics. In addition to
mathematics and biology as "hard" languages, "soft" languages also
need to be recognized:
"The study of art can be regarded as the teaching of a language for communication in
the emotional sphere of life. We may speak of the language of abstract painting, of the
language of music, and that of rhythm in poetry, and we can carry on quite serious
investigations in these directions... In any case, the definitions of language which
linguists of the traditional school have been attempting to formulate seem very naive
nowadays". (2, p. xviii)
(b) Culture: The variety of interpretations of "culture" and
itsrelationship to "language" is a theme of continuing and possibly endless
debate. The preparatory report for a Unesco meeting on intercultural studies (Belgrade,
1976) draws attention to culture as: "A related whole or more or less formalized ways
of thinking, feeling and acting which, learnt and shared by a number of people, serve,
both objectively and symbolically, to make of those people a special, distinct
collectivity" (3, p. 17). Kroeber and Kluckholn conclude a review with the statement
that: "It is evident that culture has been used in two senses, each usually implicit
in its context and validated there: culture including language, and culture excluding
language. It is also clear that language is the most easily separable part or aspect of
total culture... it is obviously easier to abstract linguistics from the remainder of
culture and define it separately than the reverse" (4, p. 244). Clearly in seeking a
broader interpretation of "language", language becomes much less distinguishable
from culture to the point that, for the purposes of this paper, they may often be
considered identical. Thus in considering the consequences of differences in culture,
Geert Hofstede states: "Culture... includes language. Language is the most clearly
recognizable part of culture and the part that has lent itself most readily to systematic
theory-building" (5, p. 27). The more distinct that cultures become the greater the
tendency for this distinction to be embodied in distinct sets of terms or languages.
(c) Information: Information is used in this paper to indicate potential patterns
of significance. This includes raw statistical data, for example, only to the extent that
the data is interpreted as forming patterns of significance. Patterns of significance may
be carried by a wide variety of media or languages and are therefore not limited to
verbalized information or graphic images. Considerable information, often of political
significance, may be conveyed by ritual, ceremony, music, poetry or body language, for
example.
Nalimov reproduces a sample of definitions of the term "information" and then
states that: "None of the definitions corresponds to our intuitive understanding of
the meaning of the word. And any attempt at defining ascribes some new features to this
word, features which do not clarify but, on the contrary, make narrow and thus obscure its
sense, and indubitably increase the word's polymorphism" (2, p. 103).
(d) Use: The uses of information tend to be conceived in terms of:
- learning, broadly understood to include becoming informed (for example in French
the news is called "les informations"). The media is fed with information by
governmental bodies with titles such as Office of Public Information (some of which may
even be "disinformation").
- action, namely the application of "know-how" to achieve some policy goal.
The prevalence of these two highly visible uses of information tends to obscure the
question as to whether the uses are primarily concerned with:
- maintenance of the status quo, adapting to changing circumstances ("maintenance
learning"), or whether they are concerned with
- formulating innovative responses to such circumstances ("innovative
learning").
This distinction was the principal theme of a Club of Rome report (6) and was explored
in connection with the limitations on the use of international organization information in
an earlier paper, especially in relation to societal learning (7).
Those concerned with information seldom publicly acknowledge two other major uses of
information:
- the accumulation of power through the accumulation of information. Organizing the
transfer and access to information is now, through telecommunications, a major business
and a number of bodies are manoenvering to control and profit from such transactions in a
manner reminiscent of the early activities of the oil corporations.
- the use of information to engender empathy and to entertain. This is a characteristic of
many audio-visual presentations and, under certain political circumstances, may well be
deliberately designed to divert attention from more substantive issues.
This range of uses moves beyond the concept of use associated with the first two items.
Information may indeed be used in a non-innovative manner and may have uses unrelated to
the content.
(e) Time: In discussing the uses of information, it is easy to assume that they
should be evident soon after the information is produced. From a societal learning
perspective however, some types of information only acquire their full significance long
after they have been produced. Much of the investment in telecommunications is concerned
with short-term information (e.g. share prices, commodity prices, new research, news,
meteorological data, military status reports). Such information frequently has a very
short "half-life", possibly measured in hours or days. The media equivalent, as
Alvin Toffler indicated, is the brief presentation of unrelated images leading to what he
terms a "blip culture" (8). In contrast the information which is eventually
aggregated into the cultural heritage may be much less easily detectable in the
short-term. It calls for a much longer exposure time before its significance becomes
apparent. Whilst such information is valued in all cultures, it is not valued equally in
all cultures (9).
Symptoms of the problem: points of entry
Recognizing the inherent difficulties, noted above, of adequately identifying
and describing the problem within any one conceptual framework, this section
uses the device of exploring a number of "points of entry" through which the nature of the
problem may be comprehended. Each of these points of entry helps in some way to clarify
the difficulties of the conceptual discontinuity which isolates distinct areas,
conditioning the kinds of information that they are able to generate and receive. It must
be stressed that the apparent ease with which some forms of discontinuity may be discussed
and comprehended often obscures quite profound differences in perspective. As is said of
the USA and the UK "two cultures separated by the same language".
(a) Medium as the message
The much-discussed phrase of Marshall McLuhan "The medium is the message" raises
the question as to the kinds of information that are exchanged using different
media. The important point here is the recognizable preference of different organizations,
groups and individuals for different media. Where some prefer information in
text form, others prefer audio-visual presentation. President Reagan is a commonly
cited example of the latter. Such people tend to avoid use of the wealth of information
available in text form even when presented in condensed form.
The reverse is of course also true. There is a considerable reluctance in some
disciplines to base any scholarly argument on information presented in graphic
form. Such an argument would be assessed as inadequately formulated if it cannot
be expressed verbally. This is a characteristic of the social sciences, especially
political science and international relations. Whilst tables and graphs may be
acceptable, this is seldom the case with audio-visual presentations, especially
in continental European cultures. The up-market French newspaper "Le Monde", together with "Le Monde Diplomatique",
pride themselves on the absence of illustrations in their columns. And yet the
information formulated by such disciplines is assumed to be of some relevance
to the politicians and decision-makers described by Harold Lasswell:
"Why do we put so much emphasis on audio-visual means of portraying goal, trend,
condition, projection, and alternative ? Partly because so many valuable participants in
decision-making have dramatizing imaginations... They are not enamoured of numbers or of
analybe abstractions that encourage contextuality by a varied repertory of means, and
where an immediate sense of time, space, and figure is retained". (10)
Other examples of contrasting forms of presentation which may be usefully cited
are :
- tabloid newspaper, containing information designed to be of special appeal to a mass
readership for whom it may be a principal source of non-local information;
- television, in which a constant flow of information is presented in benumbing variety to
a viewership amongst whom passivity is reinforced;
- rock festival, at which individuals gather to participate, often very actively, in a
media happening in which information is exchanged in a form of considerable importance to
the participants;
- opera, presenting an orchestration of music and voices, which may be conceptually
demanding, standing in dramatic contrast to the previous example (from the perspective of
aficionados);
- ritual blessing of followers by a religious leader (e.g. a pope or gurn);
- situation room, as used by the military and by policy-making bodies of large
corporations, in which considerable use is made of high technology to identify and present
patterns of information; -data network terminal through which individuals may search
through distant databases;
- plenary assemby in which representatives of governments or interest groups exchange and
present information (possibly designed principally for "home consumption") in
the process of formulating resolutions for collective action; more importance may be
attached to the process of participating than to the actual content;
- encounter group in which people meet in different ways, exchanging many kinds of
information, often involving body language, touch and expression of deeply felt
emotion.
Such different media raise the question of how to describe the kinds of information by
which they are characterized. How is it that peopleor organizations oriented toward one
such medium find it extremely difficult to make effective use of information provided
through another ? Political scientists make extensive studies of the role of media as a
vehicle for political ideas but would be reluctant to use non-verbal means as an aid to
their own conceptual explorations. Such information would not be
"serious".
To the extent that each such medium is a purveyor of messages characteristic of a
particular language or culture, what processes exist for the "translation" of
messages from one media language to another ? Examples include :
- adapting a book for film presentation;
- putting a poem to music;
- writing lyrics for a piece of music;
- preparing an audio-visual presentation of a project elaborated in document form;
transforming an architectural blueprint into a three-dimensional structure;
- building a mathematical or computer model to simulate interacting conditions recognized
by theory;
- elaborating a heuristic programme as a basis for an expert system (artificial
intelligence) on the basis of interviews with experts in that field;
- conversion of a business or military strategy into practice;
- arrangement of a ballet based on a piece of music by the process of choregraphy;
- providing a musical background to the visual stimuli of a film;
- adapting a body of scientific research into the form of a visual documentary;
- description of the range of public opinion in statistical form on the basis of market or
opinion surveys;
- translation of intuitions into works of art.
None of the forms of "translation" indicated here imply a simple relationship
between the source language and the target language. With the exception of some computer
conversions (numbers to graphs; music to visual effects), the differences between such
forms of information is indicated by the fact that none of these translation processes
have been computerized.
(b) Senses
Media may be grouped by the degree to which they call upon the information
processing capacity of the different senses. Such an approach is in sympathy
with various schools of Eastern philosophy, where the senses are usually identified
as: vision, hearing, touch, taste and smell, to which thinking is occasionally
added. It has also been suggested that in certain cultures information processing
associated with one particular sense tends to predominate. Very loosely it
has been claimed that Western cultures are visually oriented in contrast to
aurally oriented African cultures, for example (11).
Even as a metaphor however, the difficulties of communicating information conveyed
in aural terms to a person or group oriented to a visual presentation are immediately
evident. They are dramatized by efforts to explain the visually perceived world
to a blind person relying primarily on touch and sound. The blind person lacks
referents for the visual experience; as in the case of colour.
Whilst the coordination of sense experience is part of development in early childhood,
an individual gradually comes to make greater use of some senses as opposed to
others, depending on environmental circumstances. Thus the sense of smell is
largely atrophied in urban environments.
In societies the relationship between visual and aural information is complex.
Written information may be viewed as suspect in comparison to word-of-mouth reports,
or vice-versa. The translation from one form to another, "writing it down" or
"presenting it verbally to an audience", can considerably modify the
weight attached to the information, its ability to be received and the possiblities
for its further dissemination.
(c) Forms of "illiteracy"
Recent studies in European countries and the USA have revealed suprisingly
high levels of illiteracy. In the case of the USA, the English Language Proficiency
Survey, a study by the Census Bureau published in 1986 indicated an illiteracy
rate of 9% for those of English mother tongue and 48% for others. Of those who
failed the test 0.8% had some college education, 6% had finished high school,
18.6% had some high school education, 34.3% had 6-8 years schooling, and 53.3%
had 5 or less years schooling. An earlier and more stringent test of "functional competency of adults", the Adult Performance
Level Project (University of Texas, 1975), covered skills of communication, computation,
problem solving and personal relations. It found that 20% of American adults were unable
to perform everyday adult tasks whilst a further 34% could perform the tasks but not
proficiently. It is to be expected that the situation in other countries is equally
dramatic. Such tests may be interpreted as giving an indication of inability to use
information in a certain form. Clearly large proportions of any population do not make
more than limited use of information available in text form. This is not to say that they
do not make extensive and effective use of information in other forms in terms of their
needs. It is unfortunate that "illiteracy" is easily interpreted as
inability to use information when in fact it only reflects inability to use information
of a certain type.
But even amongst those who are found to be "literate", such tests do
not help to distinguish those who are disinclined to use their ability in order
to make use of information in a particular form. It is not possible to distinguish
the proportions of the literate population that uses text information (a) to
reinforce currently held views, or (b) to retrie factual data, in contrast to
those who make active use of it (c) to explore challenging, innovative or opposing
views. This suggests the need for a more complex indicator than illiteracy rate
to measure inability to make use of information in different forms.
(d) Frames of mind : multiple intelligences
A measure of intelligence may be considered as a measure of theindividuals
capacity to process information. There is a long held theory that there is
a single measurable intelligence scale along which each individual can be assessed
to derive an
"intelligence quotient". As part of the recent Project on Human Potential of the
Harvard Graduate School of Education, Howard Gardner has reviewed a considerable body of
evidence which questions the validity of this theory (12). He argues that the tests do not
measure what they purport to, and are valid only for a small Western middle-class
minority. This raises the question as to whether the prevailing concept of what
constitutes "information" is not subject to similar distortion.
Gardner proceeds to demonstrate that there is persuasive evidence for the existence
of several relatively autonomous human intellectual competences which he calls "human
intelligences" or "frames of mind". The exact nature of and breadth of each
intellectual "frame" has not so far been satisfactorily established,
nor has the precise number of such intelligences been determined. It is however
possible to demonstrate that several such intelligences exist, common to many
cultures, each with its own patterns of development and brain activity, and each
different in kind from the others. Gardner points out that the many previous
efforts to establish independent intelligences have been unconvincing, chiefly
because they rely on only one or, at the most, two lines of evidence.
Gardner presents evidence for the following distinct forms of intelligence :
- linguistic intelligence, including: a sensitivity to the meaning of words and their
subtle shades of difference; a sensitivity to the order among words and the rules
governing such order; a sensitivity to the sounds, rhythms, inflections and meters of
words; and a sensitivity to the different functions of language, namely its potential for
exciting, convincing, stimulating, conveying information, or simply providing pleasure.
Strangely however he makes no mention of competence in languages other than the mother
tongue.
- musical intelligence, including: sensitivity to pitch (or melody); sensitivity to
rhythm, namely the organization of pitch over time; and sensitivity to timbre or the
characteristic qualities of a tone.
- logico-mathematical intelligence, including: sensitivity to possibilities of ordering
and reordering objects, assessing their quantity; sensitivity to the actions that can be
performed on objects, the relations that obtain among those actions, the statements (or
propositions) that can be made about actual or potential actions, and the relationships
among those statements.
- spatial intelligence, including: capacities to perceive the visual world accurately, to
perform transformations and modifications upon initial perceptions, and to re-create
aspects of visual experience, even in the absence of physical stimuli.
- bodily-kinesthetic intelligence, including: the ability to use one's body in highly
differentiated and skilled ways, for expressive as well as goal-directed purposes; the
capacity to work skillfully with objects, both those involving delicate movements of the
fingers and those involving complex movements of the body. (Gardner points out that the
tendency to denigrate physical skills, in contrast to skills of the mind, is a Western
academic bias not necessarily characteristic of other cultures).
- personal intelligences, including: access to one's own feeling life and the capacity to
affect discriminations among those feelings, to label them, to enmesh them in symbolic
codes, to draw upon them as a means of understanding and guiding behaviour; the ability to
notice and make distinctions among other individuals, especially among their moods,
temperaments, motivations and intentions.
Gardner stresses that different forms of intelligence may be more readily accepted in
different cultures. Whilst at the same time recognizing that although the logico-
mathematical form may predominate in the West (which claims to have originated it), it is
nevertheless present in tribal cultures (such as the Kalahari Bushman) in somewhat
disguised forms.
Within this context the notion of intelligence that he advances involves the existence of
one or more information-processing operations or mechanisms which can deal with specific
kinds of input. He suggests that human intelligence might be defined as a neural mechanism
or computational system which is genetically programmed to be activated or
"triggered" by certain kinds of internally or externally presented information.
(12, p. 64). The operations of these mechanisms may be considered autonomous, without the
"modules" being yoked together. He points out that exponents of this modular
view do not react favourably to the notion of a central information-processing mechanism
that decides which module to invoke (12, p.55)
(e) Axes of bias
A well-defined characteristic of academic debate is the tendency for different
schools of thought to emerge in relation to a topic cluster. Debate within
each school of thought develops through unemotional arguments reflecting the
best of the scholarly style. In debate between schools or between disciplines,
however, where there is a lesser degree of commonality of the conceptual frameworks
(or none at all), the arguments formulated within one framework tend to appear
more emotional and as less well-founded or even irrational from another. The
kinds of information supplied from one framework are then suspect or unacceptable
to those operating in an alternative framework thus leading to
"underuse". This problem has been explored by the philosopher WT Jones (13)
concerned at the tendency for debates around certain topics to remain static and to fail
to develop over long periods of time. In particular he noted the tendency for certain
positions to be maintained (reflecting a particular framework) despite an abundance of
information concerning the validity of some alternative position. To clarify this
situation, he demonstrates that the discontinuities can be described in terms of the
different positions of the participants (or schools of thought) on seven pre-rational axes
of bias. These differences are reflected in aesthetical, theoretical, value, life-style,
policy, and action preferences, as well as in the preferred style of discussion. Any
difference between people in position "along" an axis gives rise to
discontinuity which it is difficult to handle within a rational frame of reference.
The axes identified by Jones are:
- (a) Order vs disorder, namely the range between a preference for fluidity, muddle,
chaos, etc. and a preference for system, structure, conceptual clarity, etc.
- (b) Static vs dynamic, namely the range between a preference for the changeless,
eternal, etc. and a preference for movement, forexplanation in genetic and process terms,
etc.
- (c) Continuity vs discreteness, namely the range between a preference for wholeness,
unity, etc and a preference for discreteness, plurality, diversity, etc.
- (d) Inner vs outer, namely the range between a preference for being able to project
oneself into the objects of one's experience (to experience them as one experiences
oneself), and a preference for a relatively external, objective relation to them.
- (e) Sharp focus vs soft focus, namely the range between a preference for clear, direct
experience and a preference for threshold experiences which are felt to be saturated with
more meaning than is immediately present.
- (f) This world vs other world, namely the range between a preference for belief in the
spatio-temporal world as self-explanatory and a preference for belief that it is not
self-explanatory (but can only be comprehended in the light of other factors and frames of
reference).
- (g) Spontaneity vs process, namely the range between a preference for chance, freedom,
accident, etc and a preference for explanations subject laws and definable
processes.
(f) Epistemological mindscape
In a series of articles, Magoroh Maruyama has studied patterns of cognition,
perception, conceptualization, design, planning and decision processes (14, 15,
16, 17). His central concern is the role of epistemological types, especially
as they affect cross-disciplinary, cross-professional, cross-paradigm and cross-cultural
communications. In contrasting his own work with that of previous research in
this area, he distinguishes two traditional approaches: the psychological and
psychoanalytical bases of individual differences in patterns of cognition, and
the cultural and social differences as determined by sociologists and anthropologists.
Maruyama notes the various terms that have been used to describe such patterns,
none of which has proved satisfactory: models, logics, paradigms, epistemologies.
To these might be added Kenneth Boulding's "image" (18). In Maruyama's more recent work he
favours "mindscapes". He provides a very valuable summary of these different
exercises in "paradigmatology" and their relation to social organization.
Although he no longer favours the term, he defined paradigmatology as the "science of
structures of reasoning" whether between disciplines, professions, cultures or
individuals (16). He notes that the "problem of communication between different
structures of reasoning had not been raised until recently", since scholars
tended either to advocate their own approach or describe that of others. Contributing
to this neglect is the fact that the choice between logics is based on factors
which are beyond and independent of any logic.
Although he carefully emphasizes that there are many possible mindscapes or paradigms,
Maruyama argues that "for practical purposes" it is useful to distinguish four
main types (16, p. 6). He stresses that these are not meant to be either mutually
exclusive norexhaustive and warns that any attempt at separating them into non-overlapping
categories "is itself a victim of a paradigm which assumes that the universe consists
of non- overlapping categories" (16, p. 142). What is intriguing is that
over the years he has continued to struggle with the same attributes, grouping
them first into three types (14), extended to four (15), then to five (16) and
now seemingly stabilized at four again (17).
The four types are:
- (a) H-mindscape (homogenistic, hierarchical, classificational): Parts are subordinated
to the whole, with subcategories neatly grouped into supercategories. The strongest, or
the majority, dominate at the expense of the weak or of any minorities. Belief in
existence of the one truth applicable to all (e.g. whether values, policies, problems,
priorities, etc.). Logic is deductive and axiomatic demanding sequential reasoning.
Cause-effect relations may be deterministic or probabilistic.
- (b) I-mindscape (heterogenistic, individualistic, random): Only individuals are real,
even when aggregated into society. Emphasis on self-sufficiency, independence and
individual values. Design favours the random, the capricious and the unexpected.
Scheduling and planning are to be avoided. Non-random events are improbable. Each question
has its own answer; there are no universal principles.
- (c) S-mindscape (heterogenistic, interactive, homeostatic): Society consists of
heterogeneous individuals who interact non-hierarchically to mutual advantage. Mutual
dependency. Differences are desirable and contribute to the harmony of the whole.
Maintenance of the natural equilibrium. Values are interrelated and cannot be
rank-ordered. Avoidance of repetition. Causal loops. Categories not mutually exclusive.
Objectivity is less useful than "cross-subjectivity" or multiple viewpoints.
Meaning is context dependent.
- (d) G-mindscape (heterogenistic, interactive, morphogenetic): Heterogeneous individuals
interact non-hierarchically for mutual benefit, generating new patterns and harmony.
Nature is continually changing requiring allowance for change. Values interact to generate
new values and meanings. Values of deliberate (anticipatory) incompleteness. Causal loops.
Multiple evolving meanings.
The above descriptions are brief summaries of extensive listings of characteristics in
relation to overall social philosophy, ethics, decision-making, design, social activity,
perception of environment, human values, choice of alternatives, religion, causality,
logic, knowledge, and cosmology (15, 16, 17). Maruyama considers that the influence of
such "pure" types predominates in certain cultures, although in practice the
types are quite mixed. Thus the H-type predominates in European, Hindu and Islamic
cultures. The I-type develops in certain individuals, such as those of existentialist
philosophy. The S-type is characteristic of Chinese, Hopi, and Balinese cultures. The
G-type predominates in the African Mandenka culture, for example. H, S. and G
characteristics can be distinguished in different streams of Japanese culture.
Maruyama has recently (17) compared his four types with an extensive survey of
epistemological data grouped by O J Harvey into four "systems" (19).
- System I: (a) High absolutism, closedness of beliefs, highevaluativeness, high positive
dependence on representatives of institutional authority, high identification with social
roles and status position, high conventionality, high ethnocentrism.
- System II: (b) Deep feelings of uncertainty, distrust of authority, rejection of
socially approved guidelines to action accompanied by lack of alternative referents,
psychological vacuum, rebellion against social prescriptions, avoidance of dependency on
God and tradition.
- System III: (c) Manipulation of people through dependency upon them, fairly high skills
in effecting desired outcomes in his world through the techniques of having others do it
for him, some autonomous internal standards especially in social sphere, some positive
ties to the prevailing social norms.
- System IV: (d) High perceived self-worth despite momentary frustrations and deviation
from the normative, highly differentiated and integrated cognitive structure, flexible,
creative and relative in thought and action, internal standards that are independent of
external criteria, in some cases coinciding with social definitions and in other cases
not.
The two authors find that they agree on three types and differ on the nature of the
fourth (which Jungian's would presumably consider as corresponding to a partially
"repressed function" they have in common). It is much to be regretted that such
surveys have not explored the epistemologies in "developing" countries to a
greater degree, nor the extent to which different epistemologies are co-present in the
same culture, group, individual or life-cycle. Such work would contribute to further
understanding of information based on different epistemologies is underused within other
epistemological frameworks.
Cultural determination of information processing
As noted above, the absence of systematic research makes it difficult to clarify
the effects of culture on information processing. A number of practical dimensions
of the problem have been reviewed in a series of studies by Edward T Hall (20,
21, 22, 23) and in a seminal review by Andreas Fuglesang (11). Bearing in mind
the intimate relationship between culture and language, the matter may be explored
by using comparative research on cultures as an indication of the dimension
of the problem. Particularly fruitful in this respect is a study by Geert Hofstede
: Culture's Consequences; international differences in work-related values
(5). This "explores differences in thinking and social action
that exist between members of 40 different modern nations".
He argues that people carry "mental programs" which are developed in
the family and early childhood and reinforced in the schools and organizations
of their respective cultures.
The data used for the empirical part of the research was extracted from an existing
database of the results of surveys within subsidiaries of a large high technology
multinational corporation. The survey was held twice, in 1968 and in 1972, producing
a total of over 116,000 questionnaires. This was supplemented by additional data
from people on management courses unrelated to that corporation. Hofstede argues
that the differences demonstrated in the study "have profound consequences for the validity of the
transfer of theories and working methods from one country to another" (5,
p. 12). This suggests associated consequences for the use ofinformation generated
in other countries. The findings are interpreted on behalf of policy makers in
national but especially in international and multinational organizations who
are confronted with the problems of collaboration of members of their staff carrying
different culturally influenced mental programs. The question is whether the
implications of this study can be used to offer further insights on the use of
information in different cultures.
Hofstede isolated four main dimensions on which country cultures differ :
- power distance, namely the attitude to human inequality. The index developed grouped
information on perceptions of an organizational superior's style, colleagues' fear to
disagree with the superior, and the type of decision-making that subordinates prefer in a
superior.
- uncertainty avoidance, namely the tolerance for uncertainty which determines choices of
technology, rules and rituals to cope with it in organizations. The index developed
grouped information on rule orientation, employment stability and stress.
- individualism, namely the relationship between the individual and the collectivity which
prevails in a given society, especially as reflected in the way people choose to live and
work together. The index distinguises between the importance attached to personal life and
the importance attached to organizational determination of life style and
orientation.
- masculinity, namely the extent to which the biological differences between the sexes
should or should not have implications for social activities that are transferred by
socialization in families, schools, peer groups and through the media. The index developed
measures the extent to which people endorse goals more popular with men or with women.
Hofstede presents an integration of these four dimensions. The values of the four
indices for the 40 countries are used to form clusters of countries with similar index
profiles. The four dimensions satisfy Kluckhohn's criteria for universal categories of
culture. Hofstede argues that they describe basic problems of humanity with which every
society has to cope, although for each of them there is not just one possible answer, but
a range of possible answers. He recognizes that the set of dimensions is not necessarily
exhaustive.
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Place Figures 1 and 2 here
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Of special interest in terms of this paper is that Hofstede indicates, for each of the
four dimensions, the consequences for :
- political systems
- religious life and philosophical and ideological thinking
- organizations.
In so doing he comes very close to rendering explicit the implications for information
processing. An attempt at rendering these implications explicit is made in Annex 1. This
suggests how Hofstede's four dimensions might be interpreted to throw light on the
information processing differences between cultures.
Hofstede's approach has served as the point of departure for research at the National
Bureau for Professional Training in the Ivory Coast aimed at determining management and
organizational models appropriate to African cultures. Henry Bourgoin, Director of the
Bureau, in a study entitled "L'Afrique Malade du Management" (24) notes, in
reviewing the forms of management used in African through the colonial period to the
present period of "occidental management" that:
"... l'entreprise industrielle que nous connaissons actuellement dans le monde
entier s'est surtout developpée dans le contexte culturel de l'Europe du XIXe siècle.
Une telle organisation, malgré des aménagements en cours dans différents pays, reste
fondé sur des "valeurs" particuliers qu'elle continue à véhiculer :
productivité, rentabilité, etc. Elle s'appuie aussi sur des "logiques"
particulières : planning, ordonnancement, etc. qui intègrent elles-mêmes des
éléments, qui, s'ils existent évidemment dans toutes ces cultures, n'y sont pas
toujours aussi valorisés" (24, p. 20).
He continues :
"C'est pourquoi, jusqu' aujourd'hui, les différentes formes de "culture
managériale" importée ont glissé sur notre comportement, comme une goutte d'huile
sur une feuille de manioc... Il ne put s'agir ni "d'imiter les Blancs" ni de
"faire comme nos ancêtres". Une seule voie, celle du juste milieu, est
réaliste, car elle prendra en compte le visage actuel de nos sociétés" (24, p.
20-21).
In a section entitled "Des modèles bien à nous", Bourgoin considers that valid
organizational models invented by African societies must be discovered by research into
the traditional political systems adopted by African people.
"On peut en effet les considérer comme le reflet de la pensée du groupe dans les
domaines du pouvoir, du commandement et de son organization interne. Ces structures
politiques sont en outre révélatrices des normes sociales élémentaires qui
sous-entendaient l'organisation du groupe". (24, p. 21).
Bourgoin stresses the diversity of traditional African political systems from which
organizational models may be derived. These may be divided into two main groups:
- Centralized structures
- - Pyramidal monarchy: Ashanti, Bemba (Zambia), Xhosas (South Africa), Hayas (Tanzania),
Oyos (Nigeria), Balubas (Zaire), Langos (Uganda).
- - Associative monarchy: Mandes and Senoufos (West Africa).
- - Centralized monarchy: Mossis (Upper Volta), Fipas (Tanzania), Zulus and Swazis (South
Africa), Hovas-M rinas (Madagascar), Fons (Bénin).
- Segmented structures
- - Classical segmented system: Krous (Lib ria and Ivory Coast, Ibos (Nigeria), Lobis
(Upper Volta and Ivory Coast), Nuers (Sudan), Kikuyu (Kenya), Tallensis (Ghana), Somalis
(Somalia).
- - Universalist segmented systems: Masais,
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