Enlarged version: challenges to comprehension
Home/Search
Articles >>
Themes >>
Visuals >>
Context >>
FAQ/Contact >>

Joy in the Present
      

1980

Needs Communication

Viable need patterns and their identification

- / -

Paper presented to a Workshop on Needs (Berlin, May 1978) organized by the International Institute for Environment and Society and The GPID project. Reprinted from: Katrin Lederer (Ed) in cooperation with Johan Galtung and David Antal: Human Needs; a contribution to the current debate. Konigstein, Verlag Anton Hain, 1980. Reproduced as Annex 6 of Forms of Presentation and the Future of Comprehension. Brussels, UIA, 1984, pp 207-232

Introduction
Structured need field
Outline of a metamodel
Number-coded need sets
Relationship to existing need sets
Need representation: antiquated, premature and unexpressed needs
Need representation: lists and matrices
Need representation: patterns of contiguity
Representation of N-term need sets
Implications
Conclusion
Annex 1: Example of an elaboration of a number-based sequence of systems
Annex 2: Summary of symmetrical 2- and 3-dimensional forms
References

Introduction

This paper deliberately attempts to take a somewhat different approach to the much-debated question of human needs and to the related debate on human values. It is less concerned with which specific needs should be selected as a basic set and more with the constraints on the formulation of a viable set. In particular, it is concerned with the lack of consensus on a need set even within self-selected groups and the time spent on establishing distinctions that are not necessarily comprehensible to a wider circle.

There is a weakness in the debate process. The nature of the debate of needs that we have (and its associated confusion) implies a learning process on our part—if consensus is achieved. But whatever the conclusions arrived at, they have to be presented to others, thus presumably imposing an equivalent learning process on others. And the amount of time required to clarify such an issue within an "informed" group is a measure of the confusion that will continue to surround the subject prior to any learning process—since each generation comes to it afresh, and deliberate attempts will continue to be made to exploit the confusion.

The emphasis here is therefore not on need definition but on the framework within which a need set is defined. This leaves the definition process open, rather than aiming for closure and thus stifling alternative reconceptualizations. Hopefully by focusing on the framework more can be understood about relationships both between needs and between the highly diverse perceptions of needs. This should provide a support for the debate, as well as a degree of order, without attempting to settle detailed problems that may not in fact need to be settled.

Many of the points made somewhat briefly in this paper have been examined at much greater length in a more general paper that does not make specific reference to needs or values. [ 1]

Structured need field

It is usual to assume that needs exist in isolation from one another with well-defined boundaries between them. This neglects the process of need identification that separates out the need in a manner determined by the individual's perceptual processes. The boundaries are imposed. It also neglects another important factor in the process of applying a verbal wrapping or label to the bounded need. Namely, that particularly in this domain, words are highly ambiguous (and increasingly so, the more sectors and cultures involved) and do not contain or exhaust the meaning of the need identified. At best they can serve as pointers. In the light of these remarks it is appropriate to start from the assumption of a need field within which what can be distinguished as needs are in fact woven together in a "seamless web." Johan Galtung makes the point that

"A list of needs looks like a list of components. The question is: what is the whole that has been subdivided to deliver that list, and what, if anything, has been lost in the process." [ 2 ]

Clearly, the key question is whether this need field has any structure.[ 3 ] Without discussing specific needs, suppose that there is consensus in favor of a two-need set. Implied in this decision is the notion that the two needs are (see Annex 1)

  1. Independent but mutually relevant—namely, that they are compatible. The one is not meaningful without the other. The two constitute a complete set.
  2. Of the same logical type, making contributions of the same kind to the set as a whole.
  3. Of distinctive character.

Two problems arise in attempts to understand the structure of need fields.

  1. There is decreasing probability of consensus on a need set as the number of needs included increases. In the first instance it is unlikely that a 500-need set or even a 100-need set would be formulated. Second, its viability as an ordering factor in knowledge and social change would be low. It would not attract significant support for any length of time. There is a very marked tendency to formulate need sets containing only a limited number of needs (e.g., four to ten).
  2. Even where the number of needs is low, there is considerable variation in the needs included in such need sets, depending on the context within which consensus is achieved. Part of the problem derives from confusion over the boundaries to the meanings associated with word labels for portions of the need field. Part derives from different degrees of sensitivity to different portions of the need field.

Outline of a metamodel [ 4 ]

Some evidence is available that indicates that the probability of inclusion of N terms in a set of this kind bears a close relationship to the form of the relative abundance curve for isotopes (see Figure 12-l).[ 5 ] The peaks in the curve indicate more stable configurations. There is strong evidence that this stability is based upon favored geometrical configurations governing the three-dimensional arrangement of spheres to form a compact whole. It has been argued that there is at least some probability that such "packing constraints" would govern the preferred ordering of concepts in the mind, given man's seeming inability to comprehend within a four-dimensional framework. [ 6 ]

Figure 12-1. Indication of Progressive Decrease in Relative Abundance of Isotopes of Increasing Atomic Number.

From this it would follow that there is a greater probability of a viable need set being formulated with certain numbers of needs rather than with others, although this probability would decrease with an increase in the number of needs. This raises the question of how to explore such viable sets and the dynamics resulting from formulation of a less viable set.

The following procedure gives a way of predicting and ordering the multiplicity of perceived needs. First, in the case of "human needs," in how many ways can needs be distinguished by subdividing the set?

Two-Level Distinction. The set may, for example, be split into two subsets, but in how many ways may this be done in a particular case? Depending on the level at which the distinction is made, there may be one, two, three, four, or N recognized two-level distinctions— namely, the most fundamental distinctions and successively less fundamental levels of distinction. Clearly these are not unrelated, since the less fundamental distinctions are regrouped in distinctions at more fundamental levels. For example, at the level at which only four distinctions can be recognized, the regrouping would tend to bear a relationship to the level at which only eight distinctions are made (by regrouping pairs of distinctions). On initial examination of all such two-level distinctions, there would tend to be some confusion as to the level to which they should be allocated in order that the most fundamental should not be embedded in a set of less fundamental distinctions. The probability of any particular two-level distinction being advocated as most fundamental is likely to be higher, the greater the number of possible distinctions at that level. (Namely, it is less likely that the more fundamental two-level distinctions would he recognized.)

On the other hand, this tendency is counterbalanced by the lower stability, viability, and acceptability of the less fundamental distinctions. Over longer periods of time they are meaningful to fewer people and are of less value to the ordering of perceptions, however vigorously the use of any particular one may be advocated.

In sorting out the level to which each two-level distinction belongs, reference may be made to the pattern of relations between the various distinctions at that level in the light of the underlying qualitative characteristics of the number associated with that level (see below).

Three-Level Distinction. The set may, however, be split into three subsets. As before, it is a question of the number of ways in which this may be done in a particular case. The argument above applies again.

N-Level Distinction. Clearly the argument may be generalized for N-level distinction, although, in the light of earlier arguments, N is unlikely to exceed about 10.

Now the procedure adopted to clarify the ordering at any particular N-level effectively clarifies the nature of the most fundamental distinction for N= 2, 3, 4 . . , N. This in turn provides an ordered configuration of aspects that exemplify the nature of the original totality (i.e., N= 1) that was explored by subdivision. Since the distinctions are made and labeled with words, it is vital to recognize that the result of the exercise is an approximation. Closure is not possible, for the future will necessarily develop a better sense of the significance of such fundamental needs. In addition, within whatever context this is performed, the result as a whole is colored by the constraints of that context. The resulting order only reflects a larger or smaller aspect of a more comprehensive series of meanings that could have arisen if a wider range of inputs had been incorporated.

In addition to proceeding by subdivision, clarification concerning a named need may be sought by determining that it may be considered to be a part.

Two-Level Combination. The set may, for example, be paired with one other set to form a two-element set. But in how many ways may this be done in a particular case, given that the pairing cannot be arbitrary but must be based on some aspect of the quality associated with the number 2? Such combinations could be ordered and clarified as suggested by the previous section.

Three-Level Combination. The set could be grouped with two other sets to form a three-element set. As before, it is a question of ordering the ways in which this may be done to clarify the many possible aspects of the superordinate set.

N-Level Combination. Again the argument may be generalized, although it is unlikely, as before, that the total in the resulting set would exceed about ten. In this procedure it may well be that particular combinations are not meaningful or useful. Clearly it becomes increasingly difficult, as N increases, to integrate the original set into a combination. But at any stage, a further procedure may be adopted to identify the successive elements of N-1, N-2 . . . N-M combinations. This clarifies the aspects of the nature of the more fundamental superordinate sets (where N-M = 1) that may underly any given set.

Comment

Both procedures ensure that any given set is embedded in a context. In the first case, this is in relation to alternative (or more superficial) possibilities. In the second, it is in relation to more fundamental possibilities.

By such procedures a particular set is tested and refined in a manner that should establish the constraints on its meaningfulness and communicability to those who—in contrast to the set's vigorous advocates—may be sensitive to other aspects of the context in which it is embedded. The procedures necessarily highlight the extremely limited value of dependence on the univocal, unambiguous meaning of any words (in definitions) used to label such sets or their elements.

It should be stressed that, in contrast to the usual competitive preoccupation, the concern is not with establishing any particular set as the most valid. Rather, it is to give some understanding of the probability that any such set will be advocated, perceived as valid, or widely comprehended and communicated. At the same time it supplies a context for elucidating the meaning underlying whatever marks (words, numbers, codes, etc.) are used to identify a set and its elements.

Contrary to widespread assumption, formulation of a N-term set is not without its "side effects." It is fairly obvious, for example, that a two-term need set establishes a dynamic both for those who conceptualize about needs and for thoseinvolved in any institutionalization in response to them. In this case the dynamic arising from the dyad would have any or all such dyadic qualities, as active-passive, rightwrong, we-they, dominant-subordinate, conflict-complementarity, and so on. Namely, the very choice of a two-term need set establishes the nature of the dynamics surrounding its use (e.g., between two agencies or professions, each responsible for one of the needs and consequently competing for resources). It is equally obvious that promulgation of a one-term set (e.g., the need) gives rise to another kind of dynamic. It is, however, much less obvious what kinds of dynamics tend to be associated with sets of a larger number of terms. Like it or not, certain interaction qualities are built in by choice of the number of set elements. If ignored, they will erode or completely undermine the effectiveness of any action based upon them. They define the problem by which an .N-term-based initiative will be counteracted or nullified.

Number-coded need sets

In investigating the implications of the above points, it emerged that the fundamental attributes isolated at this level of concern were ultimately related to the qualities associated with certain numbers. In fact the use of numbers to "code" such qualities gave a much less ambiguous means of representing them than via words with their many polysemantic associations. The problem, however, is one of comprehending the qualities involved, given the widely recognized inability to get beyond dyadic thinking.

The above outline suggests a way of deriving a well-ordered range of needs whose characteristics would be exemplified by the qualities associated with the number coding. This would be based upon the identification of a "primary" need (one term) and a "secondary" need (two term) to establish the series for which higher terms would be increasingly difficult to identify.

Because of their verbal ambiguity, such needs would be identified as a "fuzzy concept" having "something to do with":

One-Term: wholeness, identity, boundedness of the human being. Clearly this could focus (depending on the preference of the set creator)

  • on the biophysical level, leading to a series concerned with the conditions for a viable biological animal (a necessary precondition for any "human" characteristics);
  • on the psychological level, leading to a series concerned with the condition for a viable psychological being. And in this oneterm case, R. D. Laing's concern with ontological insecurity is relevant. [ 7 ]

Two-Term: polarity, duality of the human being.

  • on the biophysical level, this would imply the need for exposure to such conditions as heat-cold, light-dark, up-down, and so on as a basic environmental stimulus in terms of which biological processes can be ordered (cf. the consequences of sensory deprivation);
  • on the psychological level, this would imply the need for dualistic stimuli such as a sense of pleasure-pain, we-they, approval-disapproval, and so on as basic stimuli for the orderly development of the "human" being.

Carrying such series on to three or more terms is a challenging exercise in view of the difficulties of comprehension. One attempt that could be adapted to a human needs series is illustrated in Annex 1.

Such an approach would seen to identify primary needs that are so basic that they are not usually considered in the human needs debate. The intermediate terms in the series should cover those conventionally included in such sets, whereas the higher terms should identify much more subtle needs that are usually ignored for that reason. [ 8 ]

There is a tantalizingly elusive relationship to the current techniques for investigating and representing macrodynamics. This is itself interpreted in terms of catastrophe theory—namely, the theory of the transitions of attractors (macrons) in a phase space, which is the basis of the geometry of macrons as it has developed so far. [ 9 ] The interesting question is what macron patterns the mind chooses to recognize under different circumstances. The ramifications of this question are discussed elsewhere,[ 10 ] and it is interesting that the same authors are cited by Erich Jantsch in considering the archetypal implications of the decomposition of a whole in relation to modes of learning, evolution of consciousness, and methods of inquiry. [ 11 ] For example, von Franz, a Jungian scholar, states of the time-bound qualities of the first four numbers:

one comprises wholeness, two divides, repeats, and engenders symmetries, three centers the symmetries and initiates linear succession, four acts as a stabilizer by turning back to the one as well as bringing forth,observables by creating boundaries, and so on.[ 12 ]

Jantsch notes that it is the transitions between these four basic qualities that symbolize how a gestalt system maintains its nature (to comprehension?) in the presence of many temptations to become formalized. And it is the first step from one to two that constitutes the "original sin" of formal division which, according to Pankow, "separates the two sides of complementarities and treats them as identities."[ 13 ] He relates this to the work of Spencer Brown and concludes:

therein lies a formal justification for the ultimate complementarity of the search without (in the physical world) and the search within (in our own experience), "for what we approach, in either case, from one side or the other, is the common boundary between them." [ 14 ]

Relationship to existing need sets

In order to clarify the nature of this approach, it is appropriate to consider some examples of need sets. Carlos Mallmann, for example, has produced a table of need categories in Chapter 2.[ 15 ] This makes the following four-term distinctions:

existence/living growth
co-existence/co-living perfection

which group the following eight-term distinctions:

subsistence  esteem transcendence
security development maturity
belongingness renewal  

He  also  redefines  the  same   need  field   in   terms   of  nine-term distinctions:

maintenance understanding creation
protection self-reliance meaning
love recreation synergy

Johan Galtung (Chapter 3) has, on the other hand, produced a list of "basic human needs" that at the four-term level appears as:

security identity
welfare   freedom

He also chooses to distinguish more specific needs within each such category (as indicated by the numbers in parentheses), making a total of twenty-eight needs.

As is to be expected, there are various kinds of overlaps between the Mallmann and Galtung versions. Comparison is, of course, difficult because the meaning of the terms is necessarily elusive and there is no means of cross-checking the adequacy of mutual comprehension, however precise the verbal definition. Furthermore, Katrin Lederer makes the point that

as needs are theoretical constructs, any researcher's notion of even general categories of human needs is dependent on his or her perception and thus dependent on her or his value system. Therefore, any categorical system of needs is in principle as "good" as the next one. There is no logical criterion for deciding that any system is more complete than others,[ 15 ]

There are therefore two problems to be faced:

  1. comprehension and communication of the meaning of each term; and
  2. comprehensiveness or completeness of the need set.

These are even more challenging if one requires of the above authors to each define their need sets at the two-term level, regrouping the four-term elements. In the case of Mallmann, this might be achieved with "being" (i.e., existence with coexistence) and "becoming" (i.e., growth with perfection).

At this level of abstraction, however, the adequacy of comprehension of such terms must be constantly called into question—even more so were the one-term level to be approached through this framework, leading perhaps to the term "Me" in its richer sense. This is the need field labeled as a continuity to which other labels may also be applied, each clarifying an aspect of the human need at this level of abstraction. Paradoxically, the richer the sense of a one-term need set, the less "operational" it becomes in the conventional context. (The converse is, of course, also true.) Were the accent to be placed on "survival," the task might appear less problematic. The question must always be how narrow or limited is the concept of the need associated with the label, for clearly the more inclusive the concept, the greater the convergence between "life" and "survival," for example.

The completeness of the set may be tested, as suggested above, by asking of any need term (1) how it might be subdivided into subsets; and (2) with what it might be combined to constitute a superordinate set. The question is, What is the need (set) with which a given need (set) can be combined in order to enrich the significance conveyed by the individual term labels used and to render comprehensible the more abstract (fundamental, subtle) need set of which they are an articulation? And what alternative subordinate sets of needs can be identified to challenge and deepen superficial comprehension of any particular set of need terms?

It is interesting to explore the relationship between Mallmann's four-term and eight-term sets and the shift in significance in moving to the nine-term set. The whole question of the status of needs repressed from (or unexpressed in) such need sets requires careful exploration. It is too early to accept the judgment that it is only a question of the individual's predeliction and his ability to sway others to his viewpoint.

Need representation: antiquated, premature and unexpressed needs

It may be useful to think of the question in terms of a rubber sphere whose surface represents the continuity of the human need field. Each individual distorts such a sphere in a different manner, creating "continents" of expressed needs projected beyond the equilibrium mean position and intercontinental "troughs" of unexpressed needs below that mean. The topography may be expected to change over time in response to the individual's changing understanding of his shortand long-term circumstances and priorities. Furthermore, the "resilience" of the sphere may be expected to ensure that, over a sufficient spread of cultures or period of time, each need will be expressed or represented.

This representation fails to clarify the tricky normative question of needs that "should be" positively valued by society. It is doubtful whether the highly charged issue of the positive systemic function of negatively valued needs in a dynamic, evolving society could be examined at this time—either (1) as a corrective to the misuse of satisfiers of needs positively valued by society, or (2) as a trigger to provoke collective social recognition of hitherto ignored needs.[ 16 ] This raises the question of how needs may be misunderstood or perceived as irrelevant. How do we "discover" the unrecognized needs of the past? What are the articulated "basic human needs" of the year 2050 that we are now unable to recognize as significant— and why is that so? Using the metaphor of a food diet, are there psychosocial "trace element" needs the consequences of whose nonfulfillment take some time to manifest and are, by definition, difficult to detect other than by the obscure symptoms of their absence?

Why is it that both Mallmann's and Galtung's need lists stress the needs of the individual and ignore the social systemic effects on the individual of the attempt to fulfill those needs? They list the needs that can be associated with positive ("growth facilitating") feedback loops, presumably on the assumption that negative ("growth constraining") feedback loops are not, or at least should not be, associated with needs. Then at what level are they to be taken into account? If such constraints are considered to be societal rather than human needs, then this opens the door to all the distortion and abuse to which Galtung has drawn attention once the individual is no longer the measure of all things. (If they are labeled "responsibilities" rather than needs, in order to shift them into a separate arena of debate, then there is still a basic need for such responsibilities to be fulfilled by the individual, thus reintroducing them into this debate.)

In most cases the identified needs reflect the current preoccupation with deconstraining the individual, as with the adolescent attempting to throw off the paternal and maternal scaffolding of family life. But they do not contain any element of the selfconstraint needed by the adult in a bounded society—unless generous interpretations are given to some of the terms used.

The needs identified imply no limits to personal growth (contrasting sharply with the supposed limits to economic growth, possibly ignored for a similar reason), although maturity in many realms is acknowledged as being associated with an appropriate recognition, internalization, and structural use of limitations (e.g., artistic media, military strategy, Taoist philosophy,[ 17 ] design, etc.). By failing to note the need for limitations as a catalyst for qualitative maturation, the implication is one of personal growth by quantitative "spread" (reinforcing analogous tendencies at the collective level). There is, for example, no implication of a basic human need for a self-imposed constraint on reproduction or for any other form of self-discipline, including resource conservation. Because such a constraint is not yet a well-articulated felt need, the individual (or the following generation) engenders and is subsequently faced with the social constraints arising from the lack of such self-constraint and will emit the complaints (of a child expecting succour) that basic human needs are not being fulfilled as completely as desired.

The confusion is most strikingly dramatized in the case of the ultimate form of self-constraint—namely, death (as contrasted with "life" in the previous section). Need lists tend to be linear and unidirectional in ignoring the cyclic significance of aging and death as the necessary counterparts of growth and birth, almost implying a static childlike belief in eternal youth and everlasting life (in an endless summertime). This would be an immediate demographic disaster. In the light of the current image of man, there is a basic human need for gradual aging and the eventual death of the individual, whether

  1. Suddenly, as an intrinsic feature of some sports (climbing, motor racing, etc.), where it is only by total personal risk that a vital sense of reality is achieved (directly or vicariously, misplaced or not), or as associated with any form of heroism, itself a vital focus of drama in every culture;
  2. As a consciously perceived climax of a life lived and developed to its fullest extent (cf. the death of Tagore, Aurobindo, Jung, etc.), in which age is felt to be a consequence and a measure of experience;
  3. As a merciful relief for those acknowledging exhaustion at conditions they consider impossible to overcome meaningfully (cf. the euthanasia and suicide issues and the associated embarrassment); or
  4. As a basic necessity in a bounded society enjoying the unconstrained reproductive process and its fruits, but with limited resources and currently dependent on death for role renewal and social change (even in so-called revolutionary societies).

Further exploration would probably show how it is such blindspots in the perceived need set of a culture or an era that define very precisely the problems by which it will be challenged or destroyed. (This is also true of the development cycle of the individual personality.) Such problems become the vehicle for the expression of the ignored needs. In this way, for example, warfare, illness, and famine have been tacitly used by societies as a way of allowing the level of their populations to be controlled. Despite efforts to avoid this path, an alternative has not been located, and many have articulated the consequences to be anticipated in the near future.

An approach to these questions is by focusing on the possible "distortions" of some "conceptual surface" that is used to represent the complete range of needs.[ 18 ] Some kinds of distortion may favor recognition of grosser, cruder, or more selfish needs, obscuring the subtler needs that are only to be fully recognized by the future. A focus on such a surface might also clarify possibilities for "displacing" the focus of a need—a need to dominate focused on people may perhaps be usefully displaced onto one's own emotions or thoughts.

If there are criteria for distinguishing between more and less complete sets of perceived human needs, these are likely to emerge from the constraints on the representation of such sets, if they are to be comprehensible as sets of interrelated needs. This has been discussed elsewhere.[ 19 ] It may be that the Galtung-Mallmann type of "deconstraining" need set should be balanced by a corresponding set of "constraining" needs (possibly on a one-to-one basis). The models discussed here facilitate exploration of this question.

Need representation: lists and matrices [ 20 ]

Clearly the most favored representations of a total set of human needs are the list and the table-matrix. However, both conceal the question of completeness, as noted below.

A list does not order the relationships between its elements except in relation to nested sublists or in the case of a list in series form. This does not imply that such relationships are lacking, merely that they cannot be reflected in the list form. Note that a list is in fact a series of "points," but it is not necessary to conceive of it as such. The points could be represented as areas on a surface. It is only in the matrix that the manner in which the total area is cut up becomes explicit.

The cells of a matrix may be thought of as subareas of the area representing the totality that the matrix attempts to reflect. The subareas are, of course, positioned with respect to column and row commonalities. It is now interesting to ask why the area is bounded in such a limiting manner, for the rectangular or square form is one of the simplest. It provides a (paned) "window" through which the totality may be perceived. But it raises questions about the "wall" in which the window is set and the position of the observer in relation to the observed on the other side of the window.

Now to the extent that the matrix is complete in its coverage, there really should not be any "wall." The matrix should in such cases in effect "wrap around" the observer; all is window and nothing is implicit, unexplicated, or excluded. If this is not so, then the wall should be conceived as wrapping around the observer, possibly with other windows corresponding to other partial views of the external totality to which the observer may turn his attention.

From this point of view the conventional two-dimensional matrix raises the question of the conceptual significance of crossing the encompassing boundary. It seems irrational and unmeaningful because the wall is unrecognized. There is almost a flavor of danger of "falling over the edge," as sailors feared with the early "flat earth" models.

If it is assumed that the matrix is complete, then it should be possible to represent it without such an arbitrary external boundary. If the external boundary is eliminated, then the matrix takes the form of a closed surface (wrapped around the observer). By what procedure can a two-dimensional matrix be so modified, and to what does it give rise?

Consider a two-by-two matrix. The simplest symmetrical figure that retains the same number of areas is the tetrahedron. It provides four "windows" on the external universe for any observer positioned within.

The continuity of surface area of the three-dimensional figure emphasizes any functional continuity between the aspects associated with the individual subareas or facets (the "panes"). But at the same time, it draws attention to the discontinuities between the areas associated with the edges. They are not smooth transitions but are marked by sharp angles. It may then be asked (if reality is continuous in contrast to our conceptions thereof) whether such a representation suggests others that would reflect a lesser degree of discontinuity between aspects. And indeed there are, for the greater number of symmetrically disposed surface areas ("panes"), the larger the angle between adjacent areas and the closer the approximation, to a continuous surface—namely, a spheroid.

However, the greater the number of distinct areas (whatever they signify), the more difficult it is to comprehend the totality with any precision. The patterning of the surface area may be readily scanned, but it is only through the "distorted discontinuities" of the simpler and most unspherical figures that it may be grasped to any degree (e.g., those corresponding to the simpler matrixes). A compromise may be considered, however. Even a tetrahedron may be projected onto a circumscribed sphere. This cuts up the surface of the sphere into four (spherically) triangular areas. More complex figures would, of course, result in more complex patterns on the surface of the sphere.

The challenge is to maintain continuity, but the realities of the discontinuities between extant conceptual frameworks may suggest that any such goal is idealistic. Disturbing factors are:

  1. Unequal development: Clearly, a particular cell of a matrix may itself be broken down into more subcells than is yet possible with its neighbors. Such differences would be reflected in the surface patterning of the associated sphere. (The intermediate three-dimensional figure would naturally be asymmetrical to a corresponding degree.)
  2. Gaps: Assuming that the original matrix was incomplete to the extent of missing one row, for example, then its "presence" could be indicated by an appropriate number of (shaded) areas on the surface of the sphere—if their "absence" from the total pattern had been remarked, of course.
  3. Zones: Assuming that originally there were two or more unrelated matrixes that each encompassed aspects of the reality to which an observer could be sensitive, then their representation on the sphere surface would give rise to patterned noncontiguous zones separated by unmarked (shaded) areas reflecting the discontinuity between them. (The rules for projecting the plurality of intermediate three-dimensional figures onto the surface would be more complex than before.)

The manner in which these disturbing factors are handled indicates the freedom associated with this representational approach. Clearly distinct matrixes either could give rise to distinct spheres or could be incorporated onto a single sphere as noncontiguous zones (case 3). On the other hand, the possible articulation into many nested levels of a particular cell in a matrix (case 1) could be handled by representing the latter on a separate sphere if the totality of its special perspective needed to be stressed. List elements, represented by areas (see above), could be disposed around the surface of a sphere on the basis of a projection of a three-dimensional figure with the appropriate number of sides. If the list was not "complete," then gaps in the spherical surface would be required (case 2).

Need representation: patterns of contiguity

In a matrix it is clear how the cells relate to one another. Once the boundary is eliminated, however, the question of what is contiguous to what is raised.Also, in a two-dimensional matrix there are two types of contiguity (row and column) between cells. But, considering the simple example of a two-by-two matrix transformed into a tetrahedral surface, the validity of juxtaposing areas may be questioned.

Enantiodromia: A strong objection that may be made to juxtaposing cells at opposite boundaries of a matrix is that they obviously reflect extreme poles of distinction. And yet there is much to suggest the intimate relationship of extremes.[ 21 ] Whether it is the French phrase "les extremes se touchent," traditional Chinese concept of the continuous transformation from yin to yang and vice versa, or the classical Greek dramatic notion of enantiodromia, in all cases there is a functional continuity that the matrix form conceals. On the other hand, the matrix itself may be missing rows and/or columns, in which case juxtaposition would be inappropriate.

Valency: In a two-dimensional matrix, all cells have a valency of four (neglecting the boundary question discussed above). The better known three-dimensional closed figures may have surface elements of valency three, four, five, six, eight, and ten, and although not all combinations are possible, this implies a greater richness than can be adequately captured by a matrix and a richness whose continuity is maintained in its projection onto a spherical surface.

Linkage lines: In a two-dimensional matrix, the links between cells of the same row or column are clear. Such strings of areas may also be present on the three-dimensional closed figure, although partial strings are then also feasible.

Matrix projection: Although it is acceptable to portray a map of the globe as a "matrix" of latitude-longitude cells, despite the distortion, a less distorted representation is achieved by using other projections that depart from the rectilinear mode. These clarify to different degrees the time relationship between the areas as projected from the position of the observer. It is possible that representation of matrixes could benefit from being seen in this light.

Complementarity: In some matrixes, complementary pairs of cells are evident. Such complementarity may be even more evident in the symmetry of three-dimensional closed figures.

Representation of N-term need sets

In order to clarify and facilitate the process of exploration advocated above, it is useful to look at the representational possibilities. This can be done in two or three dimensions (as indicated in Annex 2). The latter constitutes a framework for richer insights and signals more interesting constraints on the problem of identifying "stable need sets."

These questions can be explored using the strut models of Annex 2 as a guideline. The struts may be conceived as "incompressible" (or irreducible) needs. (An alternative set of insights may be obtained by treating each vertex as a need, allowing the struts to signify counteraction or conflict between needs—especially between "constraining" and "deconstraining" needs, as suggested above.) But their relationship to each other must be governed by a tensional network (of norms?) to avoid privileging any particular need or allowing it any special freedom with respect to the others—for this would give rise to an "unbalanced" set of needs.

On this basis (and in the light of the series presented in Annex 1), consider the following:

One term: A one-term set is inadequate. Things are not that simple or that static. Growth of the need (i.e., the strut) has nothing to restrain it

Two term: A two-term set is also somewhat simple. The changing (oscillating) relationships of the needs to one another can only be stabilized by using four tensions. The system is, however, too abstract to take a form in 3-D.

Three term: The new term transforms the polar dynamics into a mediated system.
  • 2-D: There are two ways of representing this in 2-D. One requires "tieing" the needs (struts) directly to each other to form the conventional triangle. Here no need can grow unrestrained unless the two others grow with it. In the other form, one "end" of each need is "tied" directly to one of each of the others; but this must be stabilized with three tensions. Again, no need can grow unless the whole systems grows. Both systems are, however, still too abstract because in 3-D, raising a free need end collapses the second system or, in the case of the first, rotates two struts about the third.
  • 3-D: A stable structure can be formed in 3-D if twelve tensional links are provided; it is not truly symmetrical, however, because the struts cannot pass through the same central point. (Note: It is relatively difficult to form this structure.)
N-term: No attempt will be made to interpret the significance of each new term, since it is widely recognized that the four-term situation and above pose problems of comprehension.[ 22 ] Annex 1 constitutes a guide, but an unsatisfactory one for that reason.

Use of the strut models may be considered trivial, but the assumption here is that this is not the case. In fact, it is suggested that they provide the basis for a kind of "language" with which to discuss and compare need sets. This language is only necessary, of course, if it is assumed that the relationships between the needs (the need "pattern") merits as much attention as the sum of the needs taken in isolation.

Clearly such a language w