Assessing the Impact of International Associations
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Printed in Transnational Associations
, 1978, 10,
pp 435-440 [PDF version
]. From a paper, originally presented under the title Networks
of International Associations, occupational categories and world problems
which was completely re-written in the light of the papers and discussion
at the Conference on International Scientific and Professional Associations
(ISPAs) and the International System (Philadelphia, November 1976).
A second part of the paper on the impact of associations,
together with material from the original version, has been incorporated
into: International organisation networks, a complementary perspective.
In: P. Taylor and A.J.R. Groom (Eds.). International Organisation, a
conceptual approach (London, Frances Pinter, 1978, pp. 381-413). The
quantitative data originally presented has been updated and appears as:
International organizations, an overview. In: Yearbook
of International Organizations. (Brussels, Union of International Associations,
This paper considers various aspects of the significance and nature
of the impact of international associations on their environment, and particularly
the impact of international scientific and professional associations on
the international system. In approaching this matter, it is first useful
to examine why the question of impact is important, what is meant by impact,
and the questions raised by the process of proving impact. This establishes
an appropriate context within which to comment on the progressive increase
in the number of international associations and their interrelationships
and the manner in which networks of organizations may diffuse impact and
act as vehicles for its transference.
A. Assessment of impact of INGOs on IGOs
Justification for assessing impact
The following points indicate the major reasons for assessing impact
1. Policy concern : In order to justify an existing policy with
regard to an international association, it is appropriate to assess the
impact of the body on its environment. Of a slightly different nature is
the need for an organization to assess the general impact of such a body
on its environment before responding to an unprecedented attempt by such
an association to influence the organization's policy.
2. Resource allocation : To the extent that the allocation of
resources in support. of project proposal of a particular association is
a program rather than a policy decision, then it may be important to evaluate
the actual or potential impact of the association on its environment.
3. Acknowledgment of recommendations : Many associations
produce recommendations, resolutions or declarations which may be directly
or indirectly transmitted to parts of the intergovernmental system. In
order for IGOs to justify attention to such recommendations, they must
prove that the association has adequate political impact to give credibility
to such positions, irrespective of their content.
4. Suspension of relationships : Under certain circumstances
(e.g. ECOSOC's positions in relation to Spain, South Africa and Taiwan
and channelling of CIA funds through INGOs), an IGO may need to prove inappropriate
impact in order to justify suspension of relationships with an INGO, or
some other form of sanction or censorship.
5, Provocation : Since there is a range of INGOs associated with
the ideology of each major power bloc, the IGOs associated with a power
bloc may wish to prove the negative impact of the equivalent INGOs on any
other power blocs as a justification for some form of tacit or overt support.
(Where the impact is shown to be positive, this then becomes justification
for some form of sanction or censorship as under the previous point.)
6. Value elaboration: Where national or international assocations
have built up a climate of opinion superior in some values to those with
which the intergovernmental system is associated, IGOs may wish to recover
lost ground by proving the positive impact of selected INGOs in order to
justify binding them into IGO programmes (the UN approach to the environment
issue is a case in point).
7. Reinforcement& constituency: Where IGO member states have
for political reasons generated resolutions initiating programmes which
alienate much of its usual constituency, it may seek to prove the impact
of INGOs on such programmes in order that by so associating them it may
establish a favourable climate of opinion for the programmes amongst the
8. Tradition, prestige and public relations: Where an IGO wishes
to maintain relations with a particular INGO for special reasons, it may
prove impact to justify such a position (the relation between the UN and
the World Federation of United Nations Associations is a case in point).
Varieties of impact
The different types of impact can be grouped as follows:
1. Physical, including violent demonstrations, occupation of
offices, physical damage to buildings or equipment, violence or threats
of violence to personnel, physical assistance (manpower), etc.
2. Affective, including non-violent demonstrations, emotional
propaganda, smear or hate-campaigns, supportive campaigns, etc.
3. Procedural, including strikes, lockouts, restraining orders,
procedural and regulatory devices (legal, administrative, financial, safety,
health), resolutions, declarations, etc.
4. Programme content, namely conceptual or information inputs
contributing to the elaboration of programme content, within its predetermined
5. Organization policy, namely political, financial, statistical,
conceptual and similar inputs affecting the formulation, selection and
rejection of programmes.
6. Policy coordination, namely political and other considerations
affecting the coordination of programmes of semiautonomous organizations
acting on interrelated problem areas.
7. Research, namely conceptual and methodological advances which
effectively question the utility and significance of the problems addressed
by existing programmes and policies.
8. Socio-political, namely political, ideological and philosophical
advances which effectively question the utility and significance of :
(a) the organizational structures used to direct existing programme
and policies, and
(b) the research by which the problems and remedial action are defined.
The above grouping reflects a primarily western approach to the varieties
of impact. The situation is more complex as has been remarked by authors
such as Stafford Beer and J. Forrester :
"Le Chatelier's Principle: Reformers, critics of institutions,
consultants in innovation, people in short who "want to get something done",
often fail to see this point. They cannot understand why their strictures,
advice or demands do not result in effective change. They expect either
to achieve a measure of success in their own terms or to be flung off the
premises. But an ultrastable system (like a social institution)... has
no need to react in either of these ways. It specializes in equilibrial
readjustment, which is to the observer a secret form of change requiring
no actual alteration in the macro- systemic characteristics that he is
trying to do something about" (1).
Some eastern philosophies might even be described as philosophies of "non-
impact". They have influenced, and continue to influence, the Gandhian
non-violent approach and some aspects of the Chinese approach to social
change. It should be stressed that the western perception that such attitudes
constitute a form of passivity are but ill-informed simplifications, particularly
since such philosophies underlie the eastern martial arts. Such a point
could well be supported with citations from Lao Tzu, Chuang Tzu or similar
authors. It is more appropriate however to note the study made by Scott
Boorman on the implications of this kind of thinking for Mao Tse Tung's
revolutionary strategy (2). It could be argued that a similar approach
partly underlies the evolution of the Vietnam situation and that in other
arenas. Conventional billiard-ball models of impact are likely to be insensitive
to such strategies. It is no coincidence that Scott Boorman himself has
specialized in the study of formal social networks. (3)
The utility of the conventional approaches may also be questioned in
the light of comments such as that of Peter Drucker:
"The correct figures could perhaps have been forecast, but what
today, only ten years later, controls America's mood and shapes its policies
- not to mention its picture of itself - would have been quite unpredictable
to any statistical, projective method: there has been a change of
meaning, the quality, the perception of our experience. In 1959 the accent
was all on our affluence. In 1969 it is all on the poor". (4, emphasis
And as he predicted, the meaning has again changed unexpectedly since then.
This point is made even more strongly by Alvin Toffler (5).
It could be argued that many international associations function in
order to change meaning, to support or facilitate any such change, or to
maintain continuity through such changes. Their success in doing so is
not necessarily detectable by the methods of evaluation normally recommended.
Moreover alternative philosophies may well change the significance, if
any, of "success" as determined in this way and the legitimacy of actions
based on conclusions of "low impact".
Related to the indirect forms of impact noted above is the static impact
which in its most extreme form is now termed structural violence.
"Basically, what seems to be behind it is a pattern of human interaction,
of social order that is so prevalent, so all-pervasive that it seems to
be present as an archetype at all times and all points in space. The moment
one believes a more egalitarian structure has been created the same social
order seems to come in by the back door. It seems to survive very well
the changes from a slave society, via a feudal and capitalist order, towards
a socialist society" (6).
This "structural impact" may also be significant in the activities of an
organization and of the international system.
Issues raised in assessing impact
The process of proving and assessing impact raises a number of issues
which are briefly reviewed here :
1. The situations in which a demand is made for an assessment of impact
tend to be structured such that impact must effectively be proven before
attention is directed towards the bodies giving rise to the impact. The
"existence" of such bodies is deduced from the recognition of the impacts
to which they give rise. If no impact can be detected then the question
of whether such bodies exist is considered irrelevant. The convenience
of this approach does not eliminate the question of whether the organizational
system has an adequate concept of its environment, in that some impacts
may be undetectable by the methods or criteria used, and some external
unrecognized bodies may suddenly give rise to impacts for which the organization
2. Related to the previous point is the assumption of absence of impact
on an organizational system unless impact can be proven. It is certainly
debateable whether this is an appropriate attitude for an organization
(as noted above) or for the intellectual disciplines associated with the
assessment and its methodology. It is particularly unfortunate in that
the assumption places the burden of proving impact on the external unrecognized
body (in a manner somewhat analogous to that of a legal system in which
innocence, rather than guilt, has to be proven).
3. The demand for proof and assessment of impact places the body making
such demands in a special position in relation to those who may be perceived
as having impact. Where such bodies have a special place in the international
system (e.g. the United Nations), the conclusions of any such evaluation
effectively contribute to the definition of the reality of the international
system. Those bodies excluded from this reality by this process have no
method of appeal, since the effects of the evaluation process are not of
interest to the bodies demanding it. Such evaluations may usefully be termed
"directive assessments" because of the by-products of the evaluation process.
It is important to render explicit for whom a particular set of impacts
is considered significant and in whose interest.
4. Impact studies are organized in terms of impact on a focal organization
or group (known as the point of anchorage in social network analysis where
it is usually taken to be some specified individual whose behaviour the
observer wishes to interpret). This raises the question of what bodies
are undetected or ignored by this approach, whether such bodies may have
some indirect impact on the focal organization, and whether the behaviour
of the whole set of bodies in a network does not effectively result in
diffusion of all impacts throughout the network.
5. Current impact studies necessarily predefine what processes are to
be considered as conveying valid impacts. This raises the question of what
other processes are undetected or ignored by this approach and the consequences
of inability to focus on them.
6. Impact studies raise the question of how the thresholds are selected
below which impacts of a particular kind are considered insignificant.
(The physical sciences are fortunate in having established how "weak" and
"strong interactions" should be taken into consideration, thus enabling
them to give appropriate attention, for example, to the impact on an object
(a) of a failing weight, (b) of a mass any specified distance from it,
and (c) of weak electromagnetic forces such as the magnetic field of the
earth. The question may be asked whether impact studies in the social sciences
are able to focus on impacts analogous to (b) and (c) where there is no
direct impact as such merely the influence of forces, which under some
conditions, in the case of physics, may be of considerable significance
aside from being necessary to any adequate understanding.)
Studies of association impact on the intergovernmental system raise
the question as to how relevant the impact of one organization on another
is to an understanding of their separate or combined impact on the problems
for which they were established. The approach loses sight of the fact that
society's available institutions are failing to contain the complex of
problems on which they purport to focus.
It is difficult to avoid the general impression of a series of continuing
sterile debates about "pseudo-issues", effectively (although not deliberately)
structured to avoid converging on conclusions which could legitimate any
recommendations for remedial projects to increase the value of organizations
and associations separately and as linked in networks. Such issues can
be termed --- pseudo-issues, because, from a very realistic and practical
point of view, there is little that can be done about any of them individually
at this point in time. Such issues should better be seen as constraints
on any action strategy, rather than the prime policy concern in connection
with INGOs as tends to be the case in IGO, INGO and academic circles. Hopefully
many of these problems will be overcome at some stage, but it would seem
to be unnecessarily shortsighted to allow them to constitute delays to
effective development of the full potential of the INGO network. The organizational
instruments for action may in many cases be imperfect, but concentrating
attention on their imperfections may simply obscure the fact that they
are already quite adequate for many tasks and that the specific imperfections
are in large part a circumstance of the times rather than of their nature.
Practical approaches to improving their ability to perform their functions
may well be the quickest method of reducing their imperfections. The point
made here has been explored elsewhere (7).
Conventionai evidence for impact
As noted earlier, there are problems in obtaining satisfactory
evidence of the impact of international associations on the intergovernmental
system, particularly since within the IGO system such evaluations tend
to be tied to programme themes such as development, environment, peace,
human rights, etc.
The category of scientific and professional associations is not used
by the IGO system, although occasional references are made to technical
assocations. It is interesting that probably some white coilar trade unions
coming within the parview of ILO could also be considered as professional
There have been numerous positive statements concerning international
associations in general, produced by officials from the UN Secretary-General
downwards on appropriate occasions, as well as from government delegates.
Official resolutions frequently call upon such bodies for some action or
support. Unfortunately none of this constitutes "evidence" of impact, because
such statements may always be interpreted as having a public relations
component. Although if this is the case, the obligations felt by parts
of the IGO system to maintain good relations with such associations may
perhaps itself be considered as stronger evidence of impact. Assessments
by scholars do not in general, for reasons noted earlier, provide good
evidence for the presence or absence of impact, except in the case of intensive
study of particular associations or groups of associations (cf. the studies
of Edward Miles of space, telecommunications and sea-related bodies). IGO
secretariat assessments, such as those of ECOSOC and UNESCO, of NG0s in
consultative status are basically descriptive rather than evaluative.
Thus, although it would be possible to select, sift and cite specific
statements of positive impact, the question remains as to whether this
would be considered positive proof (and by whom) or merely circumstantial
evidence of little relevance to current theory in the field of political
science or policy studies. Current theories are indeed indifferent to such
evidence. For example, Keohane and Nye note that the impact of inter- societal
interactions and transnational actors in international affairs has been
ignored in both policyoriented writings and more theoretical works, and
that when they have been recognized they have often been consigned to the
environment of inter-state politics, and relatively little attention has
been paid to them in their own right or to their connections with the inter-state
system (8). Singer and Wallace are quite explicit about exclusion of NGOs
from their analysis: "our interests (and, we suspect, those of most of
our colleagues) are more concerned with IGOs than with nongovernmental
Finally there is the question of what criteria to use in evaluating
the evidence for possible impact of ISPAs on IGOs. Should the criteria
relate purely to the transfer of scientific knowledge and considerations
? Should they relate to science policy and use of resources for science
? Or should they simply relate to political clout irrespective of the scientific
and professional component ? Curtis Roosevelt, former Chief of the NGO
Section of the UN Secretariat, makes the point (10) that IGOs are political
institutions and an NGO can only be effective in relation to them by relating
to such bodies politically. The reality of the situation is that governmental
delegates assess the potential value of an NGO primarily in terms of the
political power of the constituency it represents. Scientific or professional
expertise does not necessarily imply political power. Furthermore, most
expertise, however technical, is now held by IG0s to have political overtones.
Even NG0s concerned with astronomy, cardiology or sanskrit literature,
for example, are not effective in IGO terms unless they take positions
on issues such as peace, human rights, etc. Clearly an NGO or ISPA low
on expertise might therefore be perceived as having more impact than one
having high expertise and little political sensitivity. What would be a
good indication of political impact in this context ? For example, the
ability to influence the wording of a resolution is an indicator of impact,
but what if the resolution is never effectively acted upon by the IGO (as
can be frequently argued). The abilily to influence allocations of funds
is, also important' but what if the resources are small relative to the
expenses of the lobbying activity necessary (as is the case with many programmes
of interest to ISPAs) ?
The disadvantages of following this route seem clear enough, and in
the light of the argument of the previous sections another approach seems
Characteristics of impact-oriented associations
It is perhaps useful to distinguish a category of international associations
whose operations are strongly influenced by the desire to impact directly
upon the intergovernmental system. Such associations tend to have characteristics
such as the following:
Characteristics of non-impact-oriented associations
a relatively high proportion of resources is devoted to face-to-face contact
with government delegates and IGO secretariat officials. In addition to
funds of the association, such resources may effectively include the time
of international personalities linked to the association (but funded through
other channels) or willing to act for it in any lobbying role, whether
discreet or overt.
the people used in the lobbying role tend to have past experience as part
of the intergovernmental system, whether as diplomats, as IGO officials,
or as national government delegates or experts. Where this is not the case,
the people and the association tend to adopt an activist stance relying
on their energy, expertise, and/or ability to feed politically embarrassing
information to the media, rather than rely on the fruits of subtle lobbying.
considerable attention may be given to actual and potential links with
the news media to maintain an image of strength with respect to the intergovernmental
system (and possibly to association membership). Such links maybe based
on the release of well-researched reports of value to the media or by the
ability to generate news by triggering demonstrations. Alternatively, or
possibly in addition, links may be obtained with influential national power
bases with their own contacts to national delegations.
considerable attention is given to the rights and procedures by which international
associations may be physically represented at intergovernmental conferences
or in IGO secretariats, particularly over matters such as the right to
make or circulate statements.
almost by definition, the existence of such associations tends to be justified
and maintained by the existence of intergovernmental entities with which
they can interact. There is a relationship of dependency.
A category of international associations whose operations are not strongly
influenced by the desire to impact directly upon the intergovernmental
system may also be distinguished. Such associations tend to have characteristics
such as the following:
Limited validity of conclusion from impact studies
a relatively high proportion of resources is devoted to the activities
and programmes of the association, irrespective of how they are appreciated
by the intergovernmental system.
the activities tend to emphasize : relationships between members, member
or association activity on identified problems, the convocation of meetings
to clarify the domain of interest to the association, or the collection
or generation of information reflecting the content of that domain. Such
activities may only incidentally involve or be of interest to the intergovernmental
the attitude of members may not be oriented towards achieving or accomplishing
specific programme objectives but rather of developing a certain climate
of opinion amongst members and others, possibly including the general public.
The evaluation of the effectiveness of such activity may even be considered
destructive of its quality and as such undesirable as well as unnecessary.
Members concern for the effectiveness of the association may be limited
to its impact on themselves and. those with whom they associate.
Some studies of the impact of international associations on the intergovernmental
systems employ a procedure which results in misleading, if not erroneous,
conclusions. An impact study may be organized in terms of one of the following,
for example :
investigation at a major intergovernmental meeting (e.g. UN Environment
Conference, Stockholm 1972; UN Habitat Conference, Vancouver, 1976) of
international association action and contact with government delegates.
investigation of those international associations having consultative status
with one or more intergovernmental bodies (e.g. Unesco, Ecosoc, ILO, etc.)
interviews with secretariat personnel of one or more intergovernmental
bodies concerning their contact with international associations.
investigation of field level activities of international associations and
their relation to the representatives of one or more intergovernmental
bodies in the countries in question.
Such studies tend to have one or more of the following unstated assumptions
Assumption I: that because part of the intergovernmental system
has given rise to an organization, a programme or a conference to focus
on a particular subject or problem, then any international association
which attempts to act on that issue would want to interact with the structure
in question. This is incorrect because a significant number of international
associations may consider that the particular structure (i) can itself
only be relevant to a (possibly minor) aspect of the issue, (ii) has been
prepared, or operates, in such a way that most decisions of any significance
are either taken in advance or in other arenas, (iii) is conceived mainly
as an exercise in public relations to focus public support and the attention
of some governments insensitive to the issue, (iv) is conceived as a political
compromise substituting for any effective action on the issue.
Assumption II: that because an international association is represented
at some intergovernmental organization, programme or conference, then the
association is necessarily attempting to have an impact on that intergovernmental
This is incorrect because a significant number of international associations
may consider that the structure suffers from the defects identified under
the previous point. In order to maintain a line of contact with the intergovernmental
body, whilst minimizing the resources engaged, they may effectively employ
any of the following strategies :
(i) ensure that any list of participants or contacts produced by the
intergovernmental body identifies the association, even though its representative
departed immediately after having accomplished this, if it could not bedone
(ii) allow the association to be represented whenever necessary or
convenient by whatever member happens to be living in the area or passing
(iii) allow the association to be represented by any enthusiastic member
interested in the activity for personal reasons (including personal status
and prestige, etc.);
(iv) allow the association to be represented by a non- member with
some special interest (e.g. conducting interviews for a research project).
Some associations may only be represented because of the convenience of
the setting for maintaining contact with other associations interested
in the issue (and irrespective of the intergovernmental activity). Note
that questionnaire research is based on mailing lists of association representatives
of the type identified here.
Assumption III: that because a representative emphasizes the
interest of his association in having impact on some intergovernmental
organization, programme or conference, that the association necessarily
has such an interest or that any of its efforts at impact are related to
the representative in question.
This is incorrect because:
(i) the representative may sincerely believe that the association has
given him a responsible role, when it has merely responded passively or
minimally to his availability;
(ii) the representative may feel obliged to disguise the minimal response
of his association, if he is aware of it, to avoid negative consequences
for his association;
(iii) the association may feel obliged to be represented to ensure
that it is still recognized as "in the game" by its peers, by any part
of the intergovernmental system which makes later use of the mailing lists,
and possibly even some of its own members or by those conducting studies
of representation which may be widely distributed;
(iv) the association may participate not in an attempt to have impact
on that intergovernmental body but in order to counteract any impression
of bias arising from its special interest in interacting with some other
part of the intergovernmental system (e.g. with a different ideological
that because information or impact has been supplied
by a person in one part of an association secretariat
necessarily reflects the official position of the association.
This is incorrect because:
(i) the person in the secretariat may have such responsibilities for
reasons similar to those of the external representative identified in the
(ii) the association may not have a position on the matter as well-formed
as is implied by the ability to respond to questions about it in particular
(iii) the association may not conform to a conventional structure and
be easily comparable with its peers;the structure may be so loose that
it is not possible for an individual to speak on behalf of the association
as a whole.
: that because information on impact has been supplied
by a person in one part of an intergovernmental secretariat,
this necessarily reflects the official position of the organization.
This is incorrect because an intergovernmental secretariat has a number
of offices (in the case of the larger agencies) or positions via which
it interacts with associations. The lack of coordination between such offices
is well recognized. Such offices may include:
(i) public information office charged with mobilizing association support
for agency programs, unrelated to
(ii) a bureau responsible for consultative relations with NGOs, in
(iii) a governmental committee defining which bodies shall be called
NGOs, and defining policy on them, which may be ignored by
(iv) departments concerned with substantive programme areas working
with useful associations, irrespective of whether they are "NGO" or international,
(v) departments emanating, receiving or exchanging information with
(vi) the agency conference environment in which a particular assocation
may get considerable air-time through several government delegates.
Thus when an intergovernmental representative complains that the associations
with which he has any contact (possibly at agency-convoked meetings) are
naive, he may well be correct. Agencies have set up such an unfruitful
environment for contact with associations that the latter avoid contact
because there are more effective forms of action. Those that do not either
have special introductions to exploit (and are therefore assessed as "effective")
or are in the process of learning what a waste of effort such contacts
can prove to be.
It is unfortunate that the process by which the social and policy sciences
accord attention to organizations (or problems) in society appears to be
so strongly governed by the information handling capacity of those for
whom the conclusions are hopefully intended, rather than by any desire
to explore the numerous existing organizations and interactions in all
their rich variety. This question has been explored elsewhere in connection
with the perception of world problems (11). In attempting to articulate
their dissatisfaction with current studies of international organizations
in 1968, Keohane and Nye "felt that an 'Everest syndrome' prevailed. Scholars
studied organizations simply because 'they are there'. We agreed that new
approaches were needed."
Their book is testimony to their success (8). The remark remains valid
however. Big impacts on big organizations are studied because they are
so visibly there. The reluctance to consider less visible phenomena is
strengthened and supported by a posture requiring unequivocal proof that
the phenomena are there before any such inquiry can be entertained. It
is an interesting question as to how much national and international NGO
activity is required before it becomes theoretically interesting or of
significance to policy formulation, and how much an adequate response to
problems is delayed by such conceptual lags on the part of those who should
be ensuring the necessary conceptual leads to anticipate emerging structural
1. Stafford Beer. The Cybernetic Cytoblast: management itself. September 1969 (Chairman's
Address to the International Cybernetics Congress).
2. Scott Boorman. The Protracted Game; a wei chiichi'lapproach to Mao's
revolutionary strategy. Oxford University Press, 1971.
3. Scott Boorman. Outline and bibliography of approaches to the formal
study of social networks. Harvard University, 1973 (Eels Discussion Paper
87). pp. 239-287.
4. Peter Drucker. The Age of Discontinuity; guidelines to our changing
society. Pan, p. 11.
5. AIvin Toffler. Value impact forecaster a profession of the future.
In: Kurt Baier and
N Rescher (Eds). Values and the Future. Free Press, pp. 1-30.
6. Johan Galtung. Feudal systems, structural violence and the structural
theory of revolutions. Proceedings of the IPRA Third Conference. Assen,
van Gorcum, 1971.
7. Anthony Judge. Practical problems in using the potential of INGO
The Future of Transnational Associations from the standpoint of the
New World Order. [text]
8. J. S. Nye and R. O. Keohane. Transnational relations and world politics.
In: J S Nye Jr
and R 0 Keohane (Eds). Transnational Relations and World Politics Harvard
9. M D Wallace and J D Singer. Intergovernmental organization in the
1815-1964; a quantitative description. International Organization,
24, 2, Spring 1970,
10. Curtis Roosevelt. The political future of transnational associations;
the opportunity for effective NGO action. In: The Open Society of the Future:
report of a seminar to reflect on the network of international associations.
Brussels, Union of International Associations, 1973, pp. 91-96 (Originally
presented to a Conference of Nongovernmental Organizations in Consultative
Status with ECOSOC, Geneva, 1972). Brussels, Union of International Associations,
11. Yearbook of World Problems and Human Potential. Brussels, Union
of International Associations,1976, (See Section P). [commentary]