13th December 2008 | Draft
of incomprehensibility of systemic neglect
- / -
Incomprehensibility within existing analytical frameworks
Strategy through poetry
Unrecognized strategic implications of paradox and logical fallacy
Strategic patterns in terms of knowing, feeling and action (in Annex
-- using a Chinese perspective
-- using a symbolic
-- using an alternative
Paradigm shift: from a single pattern to alternation between a set of patterns
Further possibilities for unconventional exploration
The following exploration uses as its point of departure a much-cited "strategic"
poem presented by Donald Rumsfeld as US Secretary of Defense. The cognitive
categories of the poem, and what was omitted, are used to elaborate various
ways of ordering strategies -- possibly in the form of "periodic tables".
Deliberate use is made of Chinese traditional perspectives on such matters,
notably in their relationship to governance. The point stressed is that there
is a need for a paradigm shift to alternation between patterns of strategies,
and interpretation, rather than depending on the possibility of finding a
single pattern of strategies -- lacking the requisite variety for the complexity
of the challwnges of the times.
Incomprehensibility within existing analytical frameworks
In recent years a range of incidents have been widely publicized as incomprehensible
in their violence or seeming irrationality. They include school
suicide bombings, the cycles of violence in the Middle East, and the riots
in Greece following a police shooting in 2008. With respect to the latter,
Costas Douzinas (What
we can learn from the Greek riots, The Guardian,
9 January 2009) argues that it is time to understand the
insurrection as the response of those who feel invisible to the political system:
Few events in recent Greek history have created such a plethora of anxious
but inadequate interpretations. Many, often contradictory, causes have been
put forward: economic (unemployment and neo-liberal economic measures), political
(persistent corruption and failure of education), cultural or ideological.
But the most prominent reaction of commentators has been incomprehension
mixed with incredulity. No political organisation directed the insurrection,
no single ideology motivated it, no overwhelming demand was put forward.
The persistent question, "What do the kids want?" often led to
the conclusion that the events were not political because they could not
be integrated into existing analytical frameworks. What seemed to unite the
protesters was a refusal: "No more, enough is enough." A stubborn
negativity characterised the insurrection. Is this a new type of politics
after the decay of democracy?.....
The insurrection can be recognised as an event of radical change only retrospectively,
if the rules of political recognition and participation are re-arranged.
This depends on those who, after the end of the insurrection, will uphold
the possibility of changing the rules of what counts as political. This is
the challenge the Athens rising poses to Europe.
The challenge of this comment lies in the asserted "incomprehensibility" associated
inability to integrate current events into existing analytical
frameworks. Assertions of "incomprehensibility" are a continuing
feature of the crises across the Middle East. They would also seem to have
characterized the financial crisis of 2008 and its emerging economic consequences
in 2009. Curiously its incomprehensibility has been determed as being the
primary reason for the rejection of the EU Reform Treaty by the Irish people
in 2008 (Post Lisbon Treaty Referendum Research Findings, September 2008).
Whilst there is much to regret with regard to "incomprehensible violence",
perhaps more incomprehensible and regrettable is the cognitive impoverishment
out of which such processes are addressed and through which remedies are sought.
It is in this context that it is appropriate to explore the strategic highlighting
offered by Donald Rumsfeld with respect to the "known unknowns".
To the extent that inappropriate responses to the supposedly
unknown reinforces uncontrolled vicious cycles, the question is what
is the learning context that would enable such cycles to be "broken" (Dysfunctional
Cycles and Spirals: web resources on "breaking the cycle",
Strategy through poetry
The former US Secretary of Defense, Donald
Rumsfeld continues to be cited for his prescience in strategic and security
circles due to his succinct articulation of the challenge of what may be known
with any confidence in a world of increasing uncertainty. His formulation
famously took the form of a "poem" -- on The
Unknown -- presented
during a Department of Defense news briefing on 12 February 2002. The insight
has been most recently used in the analysis by Nathan Freier (Known
Unknowns: Unconventional 'Strategic Shocks' in Defense Strategy Development.
Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, November 2008).
It is presented on the left below. An adapted version of that "poem" is
presented here on the right -- on The
Undoing -- with due apologies to Donald Rumsfeld.
|As we know,
There are known knowns.
There are things we know we know.
We also know
There are known unknowns.
That is to say
We know there are some things
We do not know.
But there are also unknown unknowns,
The ones we don't know
We don't know.
It is to our undoing that,
There are things unfortunately done.
These are things we knowingly do.
We also leave undone
Things that ought to be done.
That is to say
We do some things unknowingly
Without knowing what we don't do.
But there are also things unknowingly undone,
The ones we don't know
We are undoing.
The "poem" on The Undoing is presented here on the occasion
of publication of the conclusion of an 18-month investigation by the bipartisan United
States Senate Committee on Armed Services to the effect that Rumsfeld's
approval of aggressive interrogation methods in December 2002 was a direct
cause of abuses that began in the Guantánamo
Detention Camp and spread to Afghanistan and Iraq. They culminated in the Abu
Ghraib prisoner abuse scandal in 2003, where Iraqi detainees were found
to have been forced into naked pyramids, sexually humiliated and threatened
by dogs (Ed Pilkington, Senators
accuse Rumsfeld over abuse of detainees, The Guardian, 12
December 2008; Greg Miller and Julian E. Barnes, Rumsfeld
blamed in detainee abuse scandals, Los Angeles Times, 12
December 2008; David Morgan, Senate
report ties Rumsfeld to Abu Ghraib abuse,
Reuters, 11 December 2008).
However, in relation to knowing about the occurrence of torture at Guantanamo
Bay, Donalid Rumsfeld had firmly declared on 2 March 2006:
We know that torture is not occurring there. We know that for a fact. We
have enormously responsible people who are managing that situation. (Secretary
Rumsfeld Radio Interview with the Jerry Agar Show, U.S. Department
This assertion may in future be compared with the much analyzed statement
by Bill Clinton: "'I
did not have sex with that woman" (Sex,
lies and impeachment, BBC News, 22 December 1998). Both would
seem to be associated with issues explored by Paul Ormerod (Why
Most Things Fail: evolution, extinction and economics, 2005) and
A.Cerulo (Never Saw It Coming: cultural challenges to
envisioning the worst,
2006). At a press conference, the UK Tory Party leader David Cameron stated:
are debating something that we didn't do, we weren't going
to do and even if we did do it, would have been undone" (TimesOnline,
22 May 2007).
In the light of the above, the following adaptation of both variants of the "poem"
might therefore be appropriate, especially given the absence of feeling or
compassion associated with the intervention by the Coalition of the Willing
in Iraq and Afghanistan -- and the disproportionate number of deaths resulting
from the Rumsfeld-inspired strategy.
|We do indeed feel
That we do some things with feeling.
These we feel we feel.
We also do things without feeling
That we know we should feel.
We do other things unfeelingly
Without knowing they are unfeeling.
But there are also things unfeelingly done,
The ones we don't know and don't feel
Are unfeelingly done.
Given the historically unprecedented allocation of resources to the military
intervention strategically framed by such thinking, there is a case for exploring
the insights it offers into the possibility of subtler and more appropriate
strategies. The case is further reinforced by the review by Nathan Freier (2008)
of the "failure of imagination" that has been a widely recognized as characteristic
of strategic development. He introduces his analysis with the statement:
Defense analysis and strategy are inherently reactive. Historically, defense
strategy development and planning have demonstrated three critical flaws. For
too long, they have been overly reactive. Corporately, they have lacked
sufficient imagination. And, as a result, both have been vulnerable
to surprise. Recent
history indicates that defense strategy and planning fail to be sufficiently
predictive. When they do venture into prediction, it often comes as linear
extrapolation of contemporary challenges, adhering too closely to current
convention. These are artifacts of defense conservatism, finite resources,
and Bureaucracy 101.
Whereas Freier's focus is on defence, these observations might be seen as
applying with equal (if not greater relevance) to other global strategic issues
with more general security implications, including food, employment, water,
energy, climate, etc.
Aside from any personal responsibilities of Rumsfeld and his colleagues, or
the particular consequences of their actions, there is therefore scope for
imaginatively applying the first two "poetic frameworks" -- knowledge
and action -- to the complex of crises with which society sees itself as faced.
It is perhaps curious that, from a strategic perspective, any question of "feeling" is
normally set aside; even "ethics" (however engendered and justified)
cannot rightly be said to involve feeling or an experiential sense of compassion
-- however much ethical failure is experienced as "unfeeling" and
even highly painful.
|Figure 1: Relationship
of categories of "knowledge" and "action" consequences
to selected domains (tentative)
|capacity to manage
|sustainability of global warming
risk-level of speculative investment
of measures to
sustain (at all cost)
|possibility of extreme social unrest (revolution, etc)
||possibility of climatic collapse
(Gulf Stream, etc)
|possibility of sustained global financial collapse
possibility of sustained global economic recession
|impact of unforeseen
|impact of unforeseen
|impact of unforeseen
|impact of unforeseen
|Unconscious collective initiatives
||Conscious collective initiatives
The above exercise can only be tentative but does usefully highlight a spectrum
of possible considerations. The focus on "undoing" (or "unmaking")
highlights action taken, whether deliberately or inadvertently, that endangers
or undermines complex systems -- causing them to be "undone" or to "unravel" in
some way. It is notably a consequence of systemic neglect -- action taken irresponsibly
without heed for possible consequences, as foreseen by the Precautionary
Principle. At its most general level it corresponds to what Gregory
Bateson (Mind and Nature: a necessary unity, 1979) terms breaking the "pattern
The pattern which connects is a meta-pattern. It is a pattern of patterns.
It is that meta-pattern which defines the vast generalization that, indeed,
it is patterns which connect.
And it is from this perspective that
he warns: "Break the pattern which connects the items of learning and you
necessarily destroy all quality."
Descriptors: The descriptors are unfortunately somewhat clumsy
-- hence the advantage of the peoetic form. Alternatives might have been included
(perhaps using "unconscious" in addition to "unknown", and "unmaking" in addition
to "undoing"), but this would increase the complexity of the table. The inversion
of the word order in pursuit of a degree of succinct clarity, notably with
the addition of the "unfeeling" variant (as in Figure
2), therefore necessitates
a degree of reflection which may be appropriate.
Row of "unknown
knowns" / "knowingly undone": Commenting on
the orginal poem in relation to the table, Robert
Daoust (personal communication) notes that this row is in fact
absent from the pattern of poem. He argues that this is morally significant.
There are things we know without knowing that we know them, well described
by Michael Polanyi as tacit
knowledge. Polanyi's emphasis on "tacit knowing" suggests that
the descriptors of all rows might have fruitfully used such a process emphasis.
For Daoust, it is arguably in our attitude toward those things that moral
character is most candidly revealed. The most classical form of denial is
probably "unknown knowns", the associated complicity of silence,
and the things "knowingly
undone" (the "not done things"). "We didn't know",
said those suspected of implication in the Shoah -- we didn't know that
we knew (so pervasively, tacitly) and therefore we didn't do what we did… For
Daoust this seems highly relevant to the question of "political" sense
perception raised in current strategic references to the "elephant in
about blindsight (and
also deaf-hearing, numb-sense, etc.) and affective
blindsight might then be significant, as with the capacity to "turn a blind
eye" to issues that may then be said to be "unknown", of which the incidence
rendition" offers a number of examples. Such matters relate
to notions of
"deniable culpability" and the manner in which it is used to provide
impunity to those responsible for questionable initiatives -- as so admirably
demonstrated in the case of Rumsfeld and his colleagues. .
This argument is especially
relevant to the absence from the "unfeeling" variant of the poems
of any reference to things that are "knowingly unfeeling" -- as is
the case with torture. This missing dimension is perhaps usefully recognized
by Barton Gellman and Jo Becker (The
Undoing of the Geneva Conventions: pushing the envelope on presidential powers, Washington
June 2007) and is well documented by Philippe
Team: Rumsfeld's Memo and the Betrayal of American Values, 2008).
More generally this row is relevant to the attitude of humans to other species
in the environment, as vigorously articulated by animal rights groups.
Row of "unknown unknowns / unknowingly undone":
This corresponds to the issues highlighted by Nassim
Nicholas Taleb (The
Black Swan: the impact of the highly improbable, 2007). It is also
associated with the law
of unintended consequences (notably recognized by neoconservatives as more
significant than those intended). The
financial crisis of 2008 offers a striking example. The table as a whole might
be understood as a fruitful way of framing the issues highlighted by Thomas
Upside of Down: catastrophe, creativity, and the renewal of civilization,
2006) following those highlighted by Jared
how societies choose to fail or succeed, 2005).
Strategic domains: It is of course the case that the selection of four "strategic
in the table is itself controversial. In conventional terms, the financial
system and the economic system are those which are currently seen as the principal
immediate priorities. Climate is conventionally seen as vital, but not immediate.
Population is not a matter of public debate -- as reviewed elsewhere
Shunning of Overpopulation Challenge: incommunicability of fundamentally inconvenient
The four systems selected are however intimately interlinked,
including population. As the latter study noted, in a global economic system,
dependent for its viability on economic "growth", currently it is only by effectively
encouraging an increase in the population that market growth and low cost productivity
can be ensured -- irrespective of the neglected impacts on climate change (Climate
Change and the Elephant in the Living Room,
It is therefore appropriate that "finance" and "growth" should
be clustered together as "conscious" collective initiatives, and
that "climate" and "population"
should be clustered as "unconscious" collective initiatives (especially
in the light of their consequences), in the spirit of the argument of John
Ralston Saul (The Unconscious Civilization,
Unrecognized strategic implications of paradox and logical fallacy
The Rumsfeld poem has the great merit of pointing towards the need for more
fruitful recognition of the challenges of what are otherwise readily assumed
to be straightforward logical approaches to strategically relevant knowledge.
The degree of incoherence and inconsistency underlying what is otherwise expected
to be "comprehensible" calls for acknowledgement if more appropriate forms
of understanding are to emerge.
One helpful review of the challenges is provided by John Woods (Paradox
and Paraconsistency: conflict resolution in the abstract sciences, 2003).
He notes that in a world plagued by disagreement and conflict, it might be
expected that the exact sciences of logic and mathematics would provide a
safe harbour. In fact, however, these disciplines are rife with internal divisions
between different, often incompatible systems -- a situation explored more
generally by Nicholas
Rescher (The Strife of Systems:
an essay on the grounds and implications of philosophical diversity,
1985). As Woods notes, there are apparently intractable disagreements in logic
and the foundations of mathematics. Woods himself worked on conflict resolution
strategies for intractable disagreements in questions of public policy through
the research group on Fallacies as Violations of Rules for Argumentative Discourse
(of the Netherlands Institute for Advanced
Paradox might be understood as undesirable and regrettable, especially
in methodologies upheld as a standard of rigour. But in his award-winning
Klein (Conversations with the Sphinx: paradoxes in physics, 1996)
takes as his point of departure the recognition by modern physics of the inadequacy
of common sense in the construction of theories and the understanding of certain
experimental results. As he notes with respect to fundamental physics:
In contrast to the everyday world, it opposes the extraordinary to the ordinary,
difficult concepts to classical archetypes, astonishing descriptions to cosy
Whilst it might be assumed that such thinking merely constitutes a form of
armchair indulgence in a real world faced with real and bloody conflict, it
is appropriate to recognize that the development of ever more destructive weapons
of mass destruction emerges from such disciplines -- whose development is typically
funded by goverment institutions such as that headed by Donald Rumsfeld.
If global strategy (in its military manifestations) is dependent on thinking
of such paradoxical nature, it is then appropriate to ask whether requisite
governance thinking for the future should necessarily be consciously based
on more "astonishing decriptions" in contrast with the convenience of "cosy
appearances". The desirability of this is strongly suggested by the above-mentioned
references to the "incomprehensibility" of popular reactions to simplistic
governance. As argued by Etienne Klein (1996):
We need to bear in mind that science relies on the open character of the
enterprise that enables it to call in question its own structures of thinking.
Paradoxes are an intergral part of its approach, which means that they should
not be regarded as simple accidents along the way, which could be routinely
avoided by greater attention or care. Paradox is intrinsic to the fabric
of science. It is paradox that, by liberating habits of thought, provides
orthodox reasoning with its dialectic.
Given the challenge to global civilization arising from its dependence on
non-renewable energy resources, and the global security issues that are likely
to result (Russian gas, etc), a similar argument might be made with respect
to dependence on developments in fundamental physics to derive new sources
of energy, as exemplified by the recent launching of the ITER nuclear fusion
project. In this case fruitful outcomes are dependent on theoretical developments
that are even more incomprehensible. Worse still, as documented by Peter Woit
Even Wrong: the failure of string theory and the continuing challenge to unify
the laws of physics, 2006), the approach to this fundamental theoretical
challenge is "flawed" in ways that constitute a strange metaphor of that faced
by a global governance arguably dependent on its fruitful outcome.
Just as fundamental physics has had its reasonably successful Standard
Model since 1975
so might be said to be the case of global governance through the international
community. Just as the Standard Model left a number of key questions unanswered
with respect to a much-sought, powerful, all-encompassing Theory
of Everything, so the inadequacies of global governance have become evident,
notably in the light of 9/11 and the unresolved problematic issues associated
with any form of humanitarian intervention (Middle East, Dafur, etc). It is
therefore interesting to recognize the status of the development of "superstring
theory", and its total lack of any success in going beyond the Standard
Model, as a fruitful metaphor of the total lack of any success in moving
beyond the "standard model" of global governance. This is sustained
by an international
rule of law, articulated
in a network of treaties and informed by a universal understanding of human
rights -- all much-challenged in practice (cf Worldwide
Governance Indicators; Universal
Human Rights Index; Human
Development Index; Democracy Index)
As documented by Peter Woit (2006), the dominant "superstring theory" of
fundamental physics actually refers not to a well-defined theory but rather
to the unrealized hopes that one might exist. Such unrealized hopes might similarly
be said to dominate thinking regarding the possibility of global governance.
"theory" in fact makes no predictions, not even wrong ones. It is
in fact this very lack of falsifiability that has allowed it to not only to
surivive but to flourish. Woit highlights the refusal by physics to challenge
the conventional thinking that sustains this controversial situation, exemplified
by an unwilligness to evaluate honestly the arguments for and against string
theory in its many co-existing manifestations. Again this offers parallels
to the situation in the case of global governance, most recently
highlighted by the response to the global financial crisis of 2008.
John Woods (Paradox and Paraconsistency: conflict resolution in the abstract
sciences, 2003) provides an insightful framing of post modern logical developments
governing current understanding of objectivity and
realism relevant to both domains:
One of these developments is a tolerant and substantial pluralism that
has taken root and flourished in logical theory. This pluralism relates significantly
to the toleration of it. The greater the latter, the more the former does
damage to presumptions of objectivity and realism. The greater the latter,
the greater the likelihood that theoretrical rivalries will be interpreted
in such ways that conflict resolution does not matter -- or even that it
would be a misplaced thing to try to bring off. The other historical development
is what could be called the received view of the signifiance of
the paradoxes, on estimates of the damage done by them, and on the general
character of strategies for set theoretic and semantic recovery. This too...
puts in a false light objectivity and realism in mathematic and formal semantics.
Etienne Klein (Conversations with the Sphinx: paradoxes in physics, 1996) also notes how the challenge applies beyond the sciences
by referring to the study of "cotton-wool language" by François-Bernard
Huyghe (La Langue de Coton, 1991) who points out that:
...diplomats and other politicians are increasingly using a watered-down
language whose few and hence inflated words no longer have any true meaning;
a consummate consensual language that panders to the taste for tautology
and disables contradiction; a discourse which has an answer to everything
because it says practically nothing; a language unanswerable because it churns
out propositions that leave so much room for interpretation that listeners
are free to hear what they hope for. In other words, a language so all-inclusive
that it gives no chance to paradox -- and here there are grounds for unease,
we must confess. (p. 85)
In such a context it is therefore entirely "comprehensible" why so little
insight is drawn from the work of the above-mentioned research group
on Fallacies as Violations of Rules for Argumentative Discourse, or that of
John Woods on conflict resolution strategies for intractable disagreements
in questions of public policy.
Whilst the challenge of a Theory of Everything may be framed as the most exciting
intellectual puzzle for humankind, that of global governance might be seen
as that most essential to its survival. It would appear that the poorly acknowledged
inadequacies of both enterprises are evidence of a degree of cognitive complacency
and of a complicity in the inadequacies of comfortable conventional thinking.
There is therefore a case for exploiting the problematic framework offered
by Rumsfeld in the light of the subtle riches of a non-western culture -- one
which has explicitly integrated the paradoxical challenges of comprehension
of somplex subtleties into an unusually comprehensive cognitive system designed
with governance in mind.
Strategic patterns in terms of knowing, feeling and action
a Chinese perspective (in Annex)
using a symbolic perspective (in Annex)
using an alternative Chinese perspective (in Annex)
Paradigm shift: from a single pattern to alternation between a set of patterns
Conventional practice seeks desparately for a single invariant pattern of
categories through which strategic reality can be articulated. The models that
are produced and promoted in support of strategic development exemplify this
tendency. Given the fact that different constituencies have preferences for
different models, which may be variously fashionable, there is a case for recognizing
the need to engage through a plurality of stakeholders using a variety of models.
The desirable paradigm shift at this time may therefore involve a recognition
of how distinct models are used and in what ways they can relate to each other.
Etienne Klein (Conversations with the Sphinx: paradoxes in physics,
1996) helpfully highlights the challenge:
We have seen that the concept of paradigm is connected with that of consensus.
It is the doxa of scientists, the highest common factor of their
convictions. Aided by habit and success, every new theory gains in authority,
becomes a doxa, and eventually becomes established as a very subdued
version of the upheavals that installed it, even if it sometimes takes a
while to circulate.... Doxa becomes orthodoxy. If it grows
too rigid, it may degenerate into dogma, and the paradigm turns
into a machine for manufacturing new prejudices. As it degenerates, it deadens
critical vigilance and wears down reservations... It is only once prejudices
have begun to flourish that new paradoxes can provoke a crisis of the paradigm....
Every prejudice is a potential paradox becauses paradoxes are defined by
the prejudices they contradict, for instance during a confrontation with
experience... paradoxes are former prejudices, prejudices former paradoxes.
In this context, alternation is the name of the game. (p. 93-4)
The various patterns presented above, that may serve as alternative ways of
interrelating strategic initiatives, therefore raise the question of how many
such patterns exist and whether any understanding of "sustainable development"
is dependent on the ability to shift appropriately between them. Is
it indeed the case that every particular arrangement of strategies lends itself
to interpretation otherwise -- and requires such interpretation to hold a more
complex dynamic reality?
Minimally this then points to the vital importance
of recognizing a four-phase approach to many terms that are conventionally
only considered in a two-phase, binary manner in which one is framed as "good" in
some way and the other as therefore "bad". Recognized as a quadrilemma
according to Kinhide Mushakoji (Global Issues and Interparadigmatic Dialogue,
1988), the four phases may be represented as:
- Condition A ("knowing", "doing", "feeling")
- Condition Not-A ("unknowing", "undoing", "unfeeling")
- Condition A-and-Not-A
- Condition Neither-A-nor-Not-A
This would correspond to both the classical
Vedic insight of Neti Neti (Not this, Not that) and to the first insight
of the Tao Te Ching:
The Tao that can be told
is not the eternal Tao
The name that can be named
is not the eternal Name.
In the proposed new strategic emphasis on "soft
power" by the Obama presidency,
through the foreign policy initiatives of Hillary Clinton, the challenge is
then to move beyond the binary
logic of the Clinton and Bush presidencies
-- perhaps best exemplified by: "If you are not with US, you are
against US". In
precluding other conditions, such a false
dilemma (as with "guilty
even suggested that any
"abstention" in a UN Security Council vote on controversial issues
was as meaningless as that implied with respect to any failure to support the "war
on terrorism". Soft power might then be exemplified by the art of working
with the third and fourth conditions -- most notably in the Middle East.
Those conditions would seem to offer considerable opportunity for moving "out-of-the-box",
beyond the agonizingly intractable strategic dilemmas framed by the first two
conditions: employment/unemployment, health/illness, knowledge/ignorance, development/environment,
resources/scarcity, tolerance/intolerance, etc. Ironically, navigating the
subtle ambiguties of the latter conditions is most familiar, at every level
of society, in the experiential dilemmas of affective relationships, especially
of a romantic nature.
The patterns presented certainly evoke the possibility of interpreting them
otherwise. For example, the four arrangements presented in Figure
rise to other insights if the convention of reading the hexagrams from top
to bottom is reversed. This is also true of circular arrangements where it
is a convention (and a decision) as to whether they are read "top-out" or "top-in" (see Interrelationships
between 64 Complementary Approaches to Policy-making, 2007).
Comprehending the nature of any such shift is facilitated by:
The approach taken here is consistent to some degree with contributions to
the 1971 Conference on the Conceptual Basis of the Classification of Knowledge
(Joseph Wojciechowski (Ed.), Conceptual basis of the classification of
Is it the case that the paradoxes implicit in Rumsfeld's "poem" point to
an aesthetic possibility for responding to the "incomprehensible" tragedies
engendered by conventional strategic thinking? Etienne Klein (Conversations
with the Sphinx: paradoxes in physics, 1996) uses aesthetic language to
acknowledge the drama of cognitive tragedy with which some new engagement
is urgently required:
The fate of paradoxes is a tragedy. In some ways it is analogous to the
fate of theories. Paradoxes have the fiendish and matricidal power to kill,
at least in part, the theory that gave them birth.... A new theory arises
to settle a paradox, and then dies of the paradox it kindles. The paradoxes
born of new experience die of a new theory.... From offspring, they become
corpses. The paradoxical state is therefore a temporary one. Ephemeral beings,
transient interludes, paradoxes last only as long as it takes to transcend
them. But their brevity is their strength: it makes them the fuel of
scientific progress. (p. 94)
In the desperate quest by governance for "harmonious" relations (as they
are so frequently termed), there is therefore a case for taking seriously the
cognitive organization of music, given its universal appeal. The case has
been well-argued by Ernest G. McLain (The
Myth of Invariance: the origins of the gods, mathematics and music from the
Rg Veda to Plato,
1976), notably with respect to related preoccupations of Antonio de Nicolas
through the Rg Veda: four-dimensional man, 1978). The unique feature
of an epistemological approach grounded in tone, and the
shifting relationships between tones, has been expressed by de Nicolas in the
Therefore, from a linguistic and cultural perspective, we have to be aware
that we are dealing with a language where tonal and arithmetical relations
establish the epistemological invariances... Language grounded in music is
grounded thereby on context dependency; any tone can have any possible relation
to other tones, and the shift from one tone to another, which alone makes
melody possible, is a shift in perspective which the singer himself embodies.
Any perspective (tone) must be "sacrificed" for a new one to come into being;
the song is a radical activity which requires innovation while maintaining
continuity, and the "world" is the creation of the singer, who shares its
dimensions with the song. (p. 57)
for unconventional exploration
Although seemingly irrelevant, perhaps the most readily "comprehensible" articulation
of the interplay between knowing and not-knowing, in relation to doing and
undoing, is that offered by snoring (Snoring
of The Other: a politically relevant psycho-spiritual metaphor? 2006).
It might be considered especially relevant given the manner in which it is
recognized as undermining relationships.
The potential for governance offered by poetry, music and song is explored
The "philosophical", cognitive and strategic challenges of "unknowing",
"undoing" and the "negative arts" are also variously explored
"On the requirement to embrace error"
Donald N. Michael, On Learning to Plan and Planning to
Unprepared Society: planning for a precarious future, 1968
More bluntly, future-responsive societal learning makes it necessary for
individuals and organizations to embrace error. It is the only way to ensure
a shared self-consciousness about limited theory to the nature of social
dynamics, about limited data for testing theory, and hence about our limited
ability to control our situation well enough to be successful more often
Appreciation of current ignorance
Charles Darwin. The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals,
Our present subject is very obscure and it is always advisable to perceive
clearly our ignorance
Capable of being in uncertainties, mysteries, doubts
without any irritable
reaching after fact and reason.
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