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Towards a Periodic Table of Games

avoiding decision-making paralysis

-- / --

Introduction

The approach here is provisional and tentative. Three different lines of argument are developed in the expectation that they may usefully converge:

There is a vast literature on games and game theory, and consequently on the possibility of their classification. The literature covers the following often quite distinct themes, however attempts may be made to relate them in practice or in principle:

The focus here is on psychological games -- augmented, where possible, by insights from the other approaches to games. Clearly psychological games may well have a recreational dimension. They typically involve a degree of strategic thinking (especially in the form of military games), and indeed mathematical formalism may potentially be applicable to classifying them and distinguishing between them. Strategy game theory may be developed purely for military purposes although it typically has a recreational dimension (cf chess, etc). Recreational mathematics includes a concern with mathematical games, indeed the whole history of the development of mathematics is recognized has having been intimately associated with games.

The purpose of this exploration of psychological games is a recognition of the need to provide a conceptual device to sensitize people to opportunities and vulnerabilities in game-like situations -- whether to improve the game for participants or to avoid the regrettable outcomes characteristic of manipulative environments such as the following:

Many of the arguments presented in such contexts have been extensively studied under the heading of "critical thinking" on which there is an extremely valuable literature. Critical thinking is however typically disassociated from the interactivity of the game dimension and the complicity of those involved.. The preoccupation here is therefore with enhancing the degree of self-reflexivity regarding such situations. But, rather than considering them in isolation, the concern is with the possibility of recognizing the existence of a set of "games" between which people can move under different conditions -- as suggested by the set of holds and moves in martial arts.

Just as children learn their multiplication "tables", there is a case for setting these games within some form of compact, comprehensible "table" with mnemonic periodicity -- namely a degree of memorable overall patterning. The ultimate purpose is to provide people with a means of effectively ensuring the quality of their environments to the degree that they find meaningful -- whether this is understood as "securing" their own personal psychic "cyberspace" or engaging in a more open dynamic.

The proposal is made at a time when game analysis and design has become a discipline in its own right -- complementary to that of actual game skills.

*** reframing interactions

*** non-definitive, exploratory

Approaches to identifying sets and typologies of psychological games

The following are potentially useful resources in building up a comprehensive set of games.

Interpersonal games: Through his analysis of interpersonal "transactions", Eric Berne (Games People Play***) initiated the therapeutic discipline of transaction analysis and ensured widespread attention to such games in various settings. He defined as "games" certain socially dysfunctional behavioural patterns characterized by repetitive, devious transactions -- designed principally to obtain "strokes" but typically having the contrary effect of reinforcing negative feelings and self-concepts, and masking the direct expression of thoughts and emotions. As clarified by the International Transactional Analysis Association (A Compilation of Core Concepts):

Berne provided a fairly loose classification of such games. No systematic classification seems to have been developed. Ray Wegner (The Games People Play) lists 70 games considered to be those most common played -- but indicates that there are many more.

Application of "games people play" to various professions and collective bodies : Inspired by the initiative of transaction analysis, a variety of efforts, serious and less so, have been made to identify the games associated with such as:

Sets of strategies

Game theory is fundamental to strategy games but tends to identify only relatively sets of games that are typically disociated from those encountered in practice. It may be assumed that insight is to be gained from looking at sets of strategies as in fact implying sets of games. Several examples exist, primarily from China and Japan:

Tactical

Sets of aphorisms and proverbs

Encroachment

xxx

Critical thinking / spurious arguments

Therapeutic games

 

Book Description In the last chapter, the Sun Tze's teachings in The Art of War that might have indirectly influenced the stratagems are summarized.

professional games (as played by lawyers, etc)

commercial situations

situations involving belief systems and proselytizing

situations involving science and technology

security situations

 

political situations

role playing

Dynamics as opposed to classificatory perspective

Is there life after game-playing?

Tony White (Eros and Thanatos, 2005) argues:

As transactional analysts this means we must be aware that it is essential that we remain playing games at some level and remain script bound to some degree. If we became script free then we end up inert.

What to do when not playing games?

Without game-playing, they argued, dating can actually get pretty dull.

the computer-based Game of Life (first developed by John Conway) has proved to be a very thought provoking illustration of how patterns emerge, grow, move, evolve and decay over a surface similar to that of the board games described above (Manfred Eigen and Ruthild Winkler. Laws of the Game; how the principles of nature govern chance, 1981). This has been valuable in the study of chaotic systems. Versions in 3D are now accessible over the web. [more; more]

Global optimization

Chess games

Game theory -- codification of games

Patterns

Traps

Unsaid (incomplete info)

Infinite games

Sallantin

internet

Laban dance patterns

sex games (64)

Neal Riemer, Douglas W. Simon, and Joseph Romance. The Challenge of Politics: an introduction to political science. CQ Press, 2006 [Ch. 1: Games Politicians Play]

Games Politicians Play ( The Game of Politics, Wipeout: The Politics of Destruction, Lion and Fox: The Politics of the Nation-State, Strike: The Politics of Withdrawal, Civil Disobedience: The Politics of Morality)

codons genetic?

Game classification Games may be classified and sub-classified according to many different criteria. Each scheme has its own advantages and disadvantages.

A game is a situation that involves two or more decision makers (called players), where (1) each player faces a choice between at least two behavioral options, (2) each player strives to maximize utility (i.e., to achieve the greatest payoff possible), and (3) the payoff obtained by a given player depends not only on the option that he or she chooses but also on the option(s) chosen by the other player(s). In virtually all games, some or all of the players have fully or partially opposing interests; this causes the behavior of players to be proactive and strategic [more]

Typology of Games. The second tool from game theory is a general typology of games. This provides a means of codifying or classifying games vis-à-vis one another. At base, there are four major types of games. Games can be either static (i.e., single time period) or dynamic (multiple time periods), and they can involve either complete information (all relevant information is shared and held in common) or incomplete information (some information is private and held only by some players). Much of classic game theory was formulated with reference to static games involving complete information; more recent developments have extended the theory to dynamic games and also to games involving incomplete information. [more]

Stefan M. Grünvogel, Formal Models and Game Design. Game Studies: the international journal of computer game research, 5, 1 October 2005. In this article results from mathematics are used to create a formalism for games. Games are considered as systems and the design of games as the creation of models for games. By abstract control systems, a formalism for describing models of games is introduced. Methods to create new models from given ones are described. To handle complexity problems in game design, simulations of models by other models are explained. The general role of formal models for game design and the corresponding chances and problems are discussed.

Jose Zagal.Towards an Ontological Language for Game Analysis, 2005. [text] Game designers have called for a design language (Costikyan 1994; Church 1999; Kreimeier 2002; Kreimeier 2003), noting that designers currently lack a unified vocabulary for describing the design of existing games and thinking through the design of new games. Many of the proposed approaches focus on offering aid to the designer, either in the form of design patterns (Kreimeier 2002; Bjork et al. 2003), which name and describe design elements, or in the closely-related notion of design rules, which offer advice and guidelines for specific design situations. (Fabricatore et al. 2002; Falstein 2004) Other analyses draw methods and terminology from various humanistic disciplines. For example, games have been analyzed in terms of their use of space (Jenkins 2003), as semiotic sign systems (Kücklich 2003), as a narrative form (Murray 1997; Carlquist 2002), in terms of the temporal relationships between actions and events (Eskelinen 2001), or in terms of sets of features in a taxonomic space, using clusters in this space to identify genres. (Aarseth et al. 2003) Our approach is to develop a game ontology, identifying the important structural elements of games and relationships between these elements. Our use of the term ontology is borrowed from computer science, and refers to the identification and (oftentimes formal) description of entities within a domain. Our ontology hierarchically organizes structural elements. The top level consists of five elements: interface, rules, goals, entities, and entity manipulation

Johan van Benthem, Open Problems in Logic and Games, 2005 Logic games First, argumentation itself is a sort of game where opposing players can win or lose. And thus, in addition to its more dominant semantic or deductive underpinnings, logical validity also has a game-like aspect of winning strategies for players defending valid conclusions from given discourse positions.

Srinivas Aravamudan (Guru English):

A sampling of contemporary Anglophone gurus can illustrate the interaction of late capitalism with alternative modernities and that of globalization with guru English. The unconventional language games gurus play enable their participation in translocal flows of information, desire, and culture. Even as they invent an alternative cosmopolitanism, Anglophone gurus reveal the very real limits and also the dangers of their vocabularies.

Development of a binary codification of games

Games can usefully be understood as based on two parties. Typically in board games these will be coded "black" and "white". A high proportion of ball games are of a similar two-party nature (eg tennis, football, etc). In any description of the dynamics of "serious" aspects of reality, these may also be framed as "games" between two parties:

More fundamentally perhaps for those engaged in the game -- rather than spectator-observers -- any game may be reframed as a case of "self" vs "other" -- with the challenge of all the intermediary or transcendental nuances articulated in martial arts, torturer-victim, and "I and Thou" relationships.

The approach here will be to endeavour to build on the simplest method of denoting the two distinct parties and their relationship, namely:

The design challenge however needs to take account of:

Possibility of 2-line codification of games

       
A B C D
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The codification in Table 1 permits the following:

  1. taking each case independently, a distinction can be made between four conditions (whether the start of the game or its outcome):
    • A: two strong players of equal strength
    • B: one weaker player and one stronger player, with the stronger (beneath) in the initiating role
    • C: one weaker player and one stronger player, with the weaker (beneath) in the initiating role
    • D: two strong players of equal strength
  2. taking the conditions together as a linear sequence in a particular game (A to D)
    • A: game starts with two equally strong players
    • B: as a result of the actions of the initiator (below) the other (above) is weakened
    • C: as a result of the previous play, the condition of the initiator (below) is weakened whereas the other (above) is strengthened
    • D: as a result of the previous play, the condition of the initiator (below) is unchanged, but the other (above) is weakened
  3. taking the conditions together as a linear sequence in a particular game (D to A), the reverse pattern can be described
  4. recognizing that (2) and (3) can be combined to result in repetitive game cycles:
    1. a repeating game cycle: A-B-C-D-C-B-A
    2. a repeating game cycle: A-B-C-D-A
  5. recognizing that two types of continuing game are possible
    1. where 1 transformation is possible at any stage of the game,
      1. an unbroken line can transform into a broken line, so that: A can transform into C, or C into A -- in addition to the linear sequence
      2. a broken line can transform into an unbroken line, so that: B can transform into D, or D into B -- in addition to the linear sequence
    2. where 2 transformations are possible at any stage of the game, so that (in addition to the single transformation case) the two lines of a particular condition can together change transforming: A to D, D to A, B to C, C to B

The case of (1) is clearly only interesting as an introductory description to the coding. However (2) and (3) suggest possibilities for codification of a 4-stage game; (4) and (5) introduce the possibility of continuing game patterns.

Possibility of 3-line codification of games

               
A B C D E F G H
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Basis for a periodic table

isomorphs

history of configuration (TJ) and current debate

  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
                 
                 
                 
                 
Contents k25 Contents k26 Contents k27 Contents k28 Contents k29 Contents k6 Contents k7 Contents k8
Contents k17 Contents k18 Contents k19 Contents k20 Contents k21 Contents k22 Contents k23 Contents k24
Contents k9 Contents k10 Contents k11 Contents k12 Contents k13 Contents k14 Contents k15 Contents k16
Contents k1 Contents k2 Contents k3 Contents k4 Contents k5 Contents k6 Contents k7 Contents k8
                 

Possible non-tabular designs of a "periodic table"

E.G. Mazurs has written a fairly comprehensive book outlining the different presentation forms of the periodic table that have been proposed (E.G. Mazurs, Graphical Representations of the Periodic System During One Hundred Years. Alabama:University of Alabama Press, 1974.

 

PRESENTATION FORMS OF THE PERIODIC TABLE

 

Scott Seiple. Periodic Table Web Analysis, 2005 [text]

Open Directory Project [text]

Periodic Table of Elements [virtual reality]

Roger Gladwin. Periodic Table Databases, 1997 [text]

ThinkQuest Similar to mathematical Game Theory, in psychological game theory we can classify games in many different manners. We can classify games according to the number of players - characters needed in the game. There are for example two, three, five and many party games. We can distinguish one person games - they are called social programming. Parents program their children: teach them good manners, how to behave by the table, at the welcome, farewell, in relation with an elder, at celebrations, the death of a person, etc... In one cultures a behavior can be desired while in other blameworthy. For example, to belch after meal could be a sign of respect for a master of the house, a sign of appreciation for good food. In another culture it is established as piggishness and disrespect for the master of the house. In one culture a question about the health of the wife is a sign of respect, in another taboo. Games can be also divided into three groups according to gentleness or lack of it: Games First stage - socially accepted players in surrounding. Games of second stage - the ones that do not cause permanent damages, however the player prefers to conceal it from his surroundings. Games of third stage - the kind of games, if they can be called that, that are the product of the hatred of man. Again similar to mathematical Game Theory, in psychological Game Theory there are many other types of games, but to describe them more sophisticated knowledge is necessary. Each man in a particular social group choosing his own strategy gets the appropriate payoff. Each community consists of smaller communities, subcommunities and groups with more detailed or slightly different game rules.

ThinkQuest Games are ways of structuralizing time - establishing forms which will fulfill interpersonal contacts. Eric Bernie put games in a sequence of behaviors that structuralize time as following: rituals, amusement, games, intimacy, activity. A unit of social relation is called transaction. When two or more people meet in a group, one of them shows that he noticed other people for example saying something, or in different manner. We call this transactional impulse. Then another person says something or in different manner does something connected with the transactional impulse, we call this transactional reaction. Rituals Ritual is a sequence of stereotypical simple transaction (for example, short statements like “Hi!”, “Good weather we have today, don’t we?”) determined by outer social factor - these transactions are often specified in each social group and characteristic for it (different statements will be said in a group of students than between adults, etc...). Rituals can be informal, such as informal social welcome, goodbyes, or formal such as mass in church which gives very little choices of the ways of behaving. Amusements Amusement is a sequence of semiritual simple transactions. It usually begins and ends with a ritual or a procedure. They are practiced mostly at parties - social meetings or before formal meetings of a social group. Intimacy Intimacy is when social modeling weakens and individual programming becomes more intensive, for example when people are close enough to each other not to comply the rituals and procedures. Activity Activity is often identified with work. One does not usually need rituals or games while swimming, working in the garden, etc. Eric Bernie describes games as a periodic, frequently repeated set of transactions that seems faultless, but in fact has a hidden motivation. All games are unfair by definition (the real goal is hidden) with dramatic and not always exciting implication. Games are vastly unconscious behavior of ordinary people entangled in double transactions whose existence is not fully noticed and which are one of the most important evidence of social life in the world.

ThinkQuest Games are transmitted from generation to generation. The favorite game of a person could be easily observed back in parents and grandparents behavior and forward in children and grandchildren behavior. So it is possible to investigate backward the history of a game up to the distance of 100 years and forward to make a forecast for the next 50 years. Games can weaken or change in time. It seems that there is a tendency of joining together for people playing the same or complementary games. “Learning” consists mainly on teaching what games ought to be played. Different cultures and different social classes prefer to play different types of games. Different tribes and families choose different modifications of the games.

According to Berne (1961), the Child is a set of feelings, attitudes and behavior patterns that exist as relics in the adult person. It is preserved in the exact forms of behavior, emotional reactions, ways of speaking, mannerisms etc. that the person used to express as a child. [T]his phenomenon has been repeatedly reported in connection with dreams, hypnosis, psychosis, pharmacological intoxicants, and direct electrical stimulation of the temporal cortex. But careful observation carried the hypothesis one step further, to the assumption that such relics can exhibit spontaneous activity in the normal waking state as well (Berne, 1961; 11). The healthy Child is said to be the best part of a person, the source of enjoying life, being spontaneous, creative, sexual. It also motivates the activities of the Adult so as to receive most of the pleasure from the successful learning and adaptation. When healthy, the Adult ego state is an autonomous set of feelings, behavior patterns and attitudes adequate for different aspects of the real, external environment. Its function is to regulate learning, adaptation, intelligence skills, and organization of a person, to provide her with responsibility, reliability, sincerity and courage. The Parent is a set of feelings, behavior patterns and attitudes formed by a person’s re-playing the corresponding features of his parents or other authorities. The function of this ego state is to form certain automatic, habitual behavior and a set of rational prohibitive attitudes through which we save time and psychophysical energy. It also provides people with the capacity to help and protect another individual. (For elaborate ego states-model, see Berne, 1961, 1966b; Steiner, 1974; Klein, 1980; Stewart, 2000.)

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Tommy C. Li . Human Social Protocol.2004 [text]

Crimes of Persuasion: Schemes, Scams, Frauds Explains How Con Artists Will Steal Your Savings and Inheritance Through Telemarketing Fraud, Investment Schemes and Consumer Scams, 2006 [text]

Benjamin C. Works. Fundamentalism. Strategic Issues Today (The Strategic Issues Research Institute of the United States), 1998:

Clarification of what's going on in this ongoing strategic analysis is in order. I am analyzing political hot air, PR and propaganda strategies, political-diplomatic-litigational misconduct, etc, not writing emotional screed and attacks on any people or peoples in general. I do not demonize; that is the trick of tyrants: I analyze the scoundrels who do demonize other peoples in order to make trouble, so as to gain and exploit political advantage, which is the way to legally steal the source of wealth and power --government. We are looking here for keys to solutions to conflicts. We are looking for strategies at play in order to indicate strategies that might work towards reconciliation of emotionally-charged issues. We are doing this in real-time, not in an academic lab, long after the fact, when hindsight is plentiful.

* We all know that games are being played here, we just don't necessarily know which ones, or how they're played. But we do understand games. Once we understand these high-stake games of power confrontations, they cease being confusing. With understanding, fears recede rapidly. Now able to rise above the playing field and see the whole game and sub games being played (as with understanding the roles and moves blockers and defensive backs in football), we can even find aspects entertaining, even amusing in an ironic way. ãThe world is a comedy to those that think, a tragedy to those that feel,ä as Horace Walpole wrote in 1776. Our best solutions, seeking reconciliation, will be built when, understanding the true motives and underlying needs of the disputants, we can better define and demonstrate common ground beyond the loud, emotional screaming of the demagogues and stirrer-uppers of disputes. But understanding will never eliminate the need to be armed with both the carrot and the big stick,and the will to use both to the necessary extent. (To be continued.)

Complete Book of Chess Strategems

[contents] The Thirty-Six Stratagems is a unique collection of ancient Chinese sayings that describe some of the most cunning and subtle stratagems. The origins of the book are unknown. Probably an unknown scholar compiled these stratagems in the late Ming or early Qing Dynasties (around the Fifteenth Century). It was called The Secret Art of War:The Thirty-six Stratagems. All modern versions of the Thirty-six Stratagems are derived from a tattered book discovered at a roadside vendor's stall in Szechwan in 1941. It turned out to be a reprint of the book dating back to the Fifteenth Century.

Many of these stratagems had their origins in events that occured during the Warring States Period (475-221 BC) and the Three Kingdoms Period (220-280) in China. These 36 stratagems were divided into six categories, depending on situation. They are: Stratagems for the stronger force; Stratagems for two equal forces; Stratagems for direct attack; Stratagems to confuse the enemy; Stratagems to gain ground; and Stratagems for desperate situations. This division is based on the hexagrams of the I-Ching (A hexagram being a grouping of six broken or unbroken lines). The I-Ching or "Book of Change" is an ancient Chinese divination manual and book of wisdom. However, this structure had a lot of flaws. Apparently the elements of I-Ching numerology were added at some time merely to create an aura of mystery and antiquity.

This book has four new features to retell these stratagems.

(1) So far all books whether written in Chinese or in translated versions of other languages follow this format. However, this structure does not provide a guide to the user when a stratagem is most appropriate, especially when a sequence of ploys has to be formulated as the scenario develops. In fact, a systematic approach to classify these stratagems according to the basic actions or behaviors of each stratagem can enable the readers to acquire a better perspective, especially in determining the right time to do the right things.

(2) For most of the stratagems, we can trace their sources which are usually the exploits of some of the Chinese famous generals, kings, emperors, philosophers, merchants and oridinary people. In addition, anecdotes of notable Chinese people in modern times, such as Empress Dowager Cixi, Generals Cao E, Chiang Kaishek, and Zhang Xueliang are included to both explain and offer examples of each stratagem's application. Further, for many of these stratagems, it is possible to relate the teachings of Sun Tze, author of The Art of War to them. As these stratagems offer timeless insights and without borders into the workings of human nature to maximise gain and to minimise loss, the exploits of famous strategists in the West, such as Napolean Bonaparte, Otto von Bismarck, Josef Stalin, Adolf Hitler, the Desert Fox and the Desert Rat are used to illustrate these stratagems. Further, recent anecdotes or events such as the accident at Chappaquiddick, the adventures of Ian Robert Maxwell, the presidential election of Corazon Aquino, Osama bin Ladin's video tapes in 2002 and the "Shock and Awe" air campaign in the War in Iraq 2003 are included.

(3) The number "36" denotes numerous was a practice in the Chinese olden time. Another meaning is that six multiplied by six equals thirty-six. Calculations produce tactics which in turn produce calculations. Each side is mutually dependent on the other. In fact, there are more than thirty-six stratagems that can be found from popular Chinese folklore, myths, stories and war strategy books. After careful investigations of the other stratagems, we have chosen six stratagems to add to the traditional thirty-six stratagems, making altogether forty-two stratagems in this presentation. The rationale for our choice is to find the best stratagems in illustrating the basic actions in the systematic framework depicting the process of formulating strategies as the scenario develops.

The added stratagems are:
(a) Avoid the important and dwell on the trivial.
(b) Beat somebody at his own game.
(c) Find the way in the dark by throwing a stone.
(d) Gain the initiative by striking first.
(e) Prod somebody into action.
(f) Shift the misfortune to somebody else by moving the corpse to his place.

(4) Another feature of this book is the exercises provided, and they serve the purpose to enhance the conceptual understanding of these stratagems. Answers to odd-numbered exercises are provided. As an academic, Douglas thinks this feature is welcome by his colleagues who have included The Thirty-six Stratagems in the teaching materials for courses in Business Strategies or Military/Public Administrative Strategies.

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