- / -
reframing project logic
phases of dynamic:
("as the message")
|see / experience
an other (negative)
closed system recycling
|see / experience
an other (negative)
|see / experience
of 2D surface,
open system recycling
("otherness", abnormality, "alternative", unsaid)
"negative" / "an other"
each cell of the 3x3 table can become a 3x3 set of cells = 81
Leon James (The Mobius Strip Book, 1976)
Escher's Mobius strip as a symbol of. the interconnected nature of motivation and cogni- ...
JSTOR: Cognitive Development: Some Pervasive Issues The concern of a psychology of cognition is the relation between reality and ... The "outside" and "inside" are really one side of a mobius environment. ...
Enactivating a Cognitive Fusion Reactor: Imaginal Transformation ... The unconventional nature of the cognitive fusion initiative is then ... Science, Paradox, and the Moebius Principle. Albany: State University of New York ...
J. Stewart (1996). Cognition = Life : Implications for higher-level cognition. Behavioural Processes 35: 311-326. Cognition = life: Implications for higher-level cognition John Stewart
My own position, however, is that Heidegger is not neccesarily right. I believe that it is possible to rearticulate science and philosophy, and I have argued that the constructivist paradigm in cognitive science is an appropriate tool for the task. It is worth noting here that "cognition" is both the object of cognitive science and, since science is itself a cognitive activity, the subject of scientific discourse. Conversely, the "observer" who identifies living organisation as autopoïetic and who makes a distinction between "organism" and "ecological niche" is also a cognitive being included as a scientific object in the domain of the theory itself. In a constructivist account of the evolution of cognition, such as that sketched in outline here, these two aspects are related by coming full circle to the point of departure. This figure is somewhat akin to a Moebius strip, in that the subject and the object are locally distinct (and inseparable) like the two faces of the strip); yet via a complete revolution, the subject becomes the object and vice versa. This global figure of a circle or spiral has been quite explicitly thematized by a number of authors, notably Piaget (1972), von Forster (1974), Morin (1977) and Maturana and Varela (1987). The point I want to make here is that as a consequence of this "circular" figure, the non-objectivist character of the constructivist paradigm necessarily and intrinsically applies reflexively to itself. The fact that a thorough-going constructivism leads to a renewal of our understanding of science itself has been well illustrated by Latour and Woolgar (1979). In other words, this paradigm is both interpretative and self-interpretative. Classical natural science is (implicitly or explicitly) grounded in the ontological postulate of a unique objective reality; this postulate is however generally considered to be meta-physical, i.e. not to be a part of science itself. This is the reason for Heidegger's evaluation of the philosophical limitations of classical science (physics being the prototypical example). The constructivist paradigm, by contrast, is intrinsically hermeneutical; it is grounded not in any absolute reference, but simply by its own coherency and viability as an interpretation. Since no interpretation can claim principled uniqueness, this paradigm is necessarily tolerant and pluralistic; with the interesting corollary that constructivism does not and cannot disqualify computationalism or indeed any other paradigm capable of manifesting its viability. The difference remains, however, that constructivism (unlike computationalism) includes reflexion on its own philosophical status as an integral part of scientific practice. I therefore claim, in conclusion, that Heidegger was not necessarily right and that science can think. To paraphrase the words of the poet T.S. Eliot: coming upon a footprint in the sand, and recognizing it as our own, we may know the place - and ourselves as scientists - for the first time.
Christopher D. Morris ( Barth and Lacan: The World of the Moebius Strip . Critique, Vol. 17, 1975 [text]
Nils A. Baas and Claus Emmeche. On Emergence and Explanation, Intellectica 1997/2, no.25, pp.67-83 (also as: the SFI Working Paper 97-02-008. Santa Fe Institute, New Mexico, U.S.A) [text]
One may ask whether a phenomenon like emergence (or holism) can be made mathematically respectable. Our answer is absolutely yes! Take for example the ways complicated `surfaces' like manifolds are being glued together from elementary pieces. New topological and geometrical properties occur, but may often require sophisticated "observational" functors like cohomology theories to be detected and described. Furthermore, in a knot where is the knottedness? It is a global property, having no meaning locally. Or in a Moebius band - where is the twist? Same thing again! (See Penrose 1995).
M. Emmer, Visual Art and Mathematics: the Moebius Band, Leonardo 13, 109 (1980). [text]
"The Möbius Trip" by Dominic Woolf 2004
is essential reading for anyone who has been puzzled by the greatest paradoxes - how is it possible for us to be conscious or aware, and how is it possible for the universe to exist?
The Parallax of Set and Relation, Larval Subjects, 11 August 2006
As Zizek describes it, The standard definition of parallax is: the apparent displacement of an object (the shift of its position against a background), caused by a change in observational position that provides a new line of sight. The philosophical twist to be added, of course, is that the observed difference is not simply "subjective," due to the fact that the same object which exists "out there" is seen from two different stances, or points of view. It is rather that, as Hegel would have put it, subject and object are inherently 'mediated,' so that an 'epistemological' shift in the subjects point of view always reflects an 'ontological' shift in the object itself. Or-- to put it in Lacanese --the subject's gaze is always-already inscribed into the perceived object itself, in the guise of its 'blind spot,' that which is 'in the object more than the object itself,' the point from which the object returns the gaze. (PV, 17)
Alckmar Luiz dos Santos. The internetic knowledge
Thus, before starting up this internetic knowledge, we must be aware of the cyberspace and set up the manner we can establish something like a cognitive path, from its frontier conditions and our proper contingencies. In this case, it is not useless to remind the etymology of cybernetics, term coined from the greek kybernetiké that leads to the helmsman, and to the act of giving a path to the navigation in bad weather or lull (as well as, nowadays, in this cyberspace called Web, we move into a mass of information, and, also, connection losses). This explains why the reasoning that can take place in the cyberspace arises not as a pre-established activity by well-known paths, following a so-called Great Reason disguised of dogmas or prejudices, but as a constant even provisional taking back of a rationality that we carry in our bodies. In a few words, it concerns a rationality that is always in movement, capable of establishing unexpected connections between hypothesis and deductions, until we are no longer able to distinguish them, like a rhetoric or argumentative Moebius curve, where interior (exterior) and anterior (posterior) become the same thing. In the cyberspace, it is important to stress the connectivist architecture that allows it to crystallize and be navigated, or, in other words, the feature that allows us to start our reading in any point and always reach another one. Nevertheless, we must argue that this connectivist architecture does not fade the differences between the points, and, more important, that we do not become capable of unbounded aware of all points and navigation paths. All this issues concern the necessity of giving limits to the reason, mainly to this reason that takes place in a cyberspace that pretends to have no limits. If its connections are virtually endless, if there is no definitive or tangible limits in its informational stream, there is always a limit to the human knowledge. Besides, knowledge without limits tends to 'dis-reason' or to its counterpart, the irrationalism. It seems easy to understand, then, why there is no place to a god in the cyberspace.
Transformative -- mobius
Circulation of the Light --
Liberation of Integration -- oscillat
Territory construed as the Map:
** enactive: mirror neurons -- autism -- reflected
** global (ideal) vs local (embody)
despair at overload (incomprehension) vs information quality
** Council of Whys: de Bono Beautful Mind
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